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NOTES
REGULATION D: COHERENT EXEMPTIONS FOR SMALL
BUSINESSES UNDER THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1933
In March of 1982 the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) adopted Regulation D1 (Reg. D), which governs offerings exempt from registration under the Securities Act of 1933.2 The SEC
promulgated Reg. D to encourage capital formation among small
businesses3 and to simplify the existing regulatory scheme. 4 Additionally, the SEC intended the adoption of Reg. D by state securities administrators to create a uniform federal-state exemption
framework. 5
Reg. D is a series of six rules replacing three separate rules governing small, medium, and large offerings.6 By combining the for1. 47 Fed. Reg. 11,251, 11,262-66 (1982) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.501-.506). The
Appendix to this Note contains a chart summarizing Reg. D and comparing it to former
exemptions. See id. at 11,259. See also infra note 66.
2. Securities Act of 1933, §§ 1-26, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77(a) - 77 (bbbb) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
3. 46 Fed. Reg. 41,791 (1981). As used in the Securities Act, "small business" means "any
issuer whose total assets on the last day of its most recent fiscal year were $2.5 million or
less" and who conducts or proposes to conduct an offering of securities of less than $5 million. Div. OF CORP. FIN., OFFICE OF SMALL Bus. POLICY, U.S. SEC, INrrIA REGULATORY FLEXIBILITY ANALYSIS (for Reg. D) 4 (Autumn 1981) [hereinafter cited as IRFA]. The Small Business Administration's (SBA) definition of "small business," although roughly comparable,
varies according to industry group and is based on annual sales and number of employees.
PUBLIC COMM. Div., U.S. SBA, FACTS ABOUT SMALL BUSINESS AND THE U.S. SMALL BUSINESS
ADMINISTRATION 7-8 (Feb. 1981) [hereinafter cited as FACTS ABOUT SMALL BUsINESS].
4. 47 Fed. Reg. 11,251 (1982) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.501-.506).
5. Id. at 11,252. "[T]he Commission, through its Division of Corporation Finance, has
coordinated with the North American Securities Administrators Association ('NASAA') ...
to develop a basic framework of limited offering exemptions that can apply uniformly at the
federal and state levels. Regulation D is intended to be the principal element of this framework." Id. (footnotes omitted).
6. Id. at 11,251, 11,252. Prior to Reg. D, Rule 240 governed offerings up to $100 thousand;
Rule 242 governed offerings up to $2 million; Rule 146 governed offerings in excess of $2
million. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.240e, .242(c), .146 (1981). Under Reg. D, Rule 504 governs offerings
up to $500 thousand; Rule 505 governs offerings up to $5 million; Rule 506 governs offerings
without a dollar limit. 47 Fed. Reg. 11,266.
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mer separate rules into one regulation with uniform terms and conditions, the SEC simplified the limited offering exemptions,
making them internally consistent.7 The SEC's liberalization of registration and disclosure requirements in Reg. D, however, may
sacrifice some investor protection.8
The SEC has modified the Securities Act several times recently
to encourage capital formation among small entities.9 Because Reg.
D is part of this trend, this Note begins by placing Reg. D in the
larger context of securities registration requirements. This Note
then analyzes the changes Reg. D makes in relation to previous
exemption rules. Finally, this Note concludes by discussing potential problems in complying with the new regulation.
THE DEVELOPMENT OF LIMITED OFFERING ExEMPTIONS

The Securities Act of 1933 (the Act) makes unlawful the sale of
any security not registered with the SEC. 10 Issuers must file a registration statement disclosing certain information about the issuer, its business, and the securities being offered for sale. 1 The
Act also makes unlawful the delivery of any security for sale not

7. 46 Fed. Reg. 41,791 (1981). Rule.501 contains uniform terms and definitions applicable
to Rules 504-506, 47 Fed. Reg. 11,262-64 (1982) (to be codified at 17 U.S.C. § 230.501); Rule
502 contains general conditions, 47 Fed. Reg. 11,264-65 (1982) (to be codified at 17 U.S.C. §
230.502); Rule 503 provides a common notice of sales form to be used for offerings under
Reg. D, 47 Fed. Reg. 11,265 (1982) (to be codified at 17 U.S.C. § 230.503).
8. For a discussion of investor protection, see infra notes 96-114 and accompanying text.

9. See 46 Fed. Reg. 41,791-92.
10. Securities Act of 1933, § 5(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77e(a)(1) (1976).
11. Id. § 7, 15 U.S.C. § 77g.
The basic registration form, Form S-1, requires, among other things, a

description of the company's business, its properties, material transactions between the company and its officers and directors, the plan for distributing the
securities and the intended use of the proceeds, capitalization, competition,
identification of officers and directors and their remuneration, and any pending
legal proceedings .... In addition, there are also detailed requirements concerning financial statements, including the requirement that such statements

be audited by an independent certified public accountant. The company must
also provide any other information that is necessary to make the statements
complete and not misleading, in addition to the information expressly required
by the form.
OFFICE OF CHIEF COUNSEL FOR

Anvoc., SBA

AND OFFICE OF SMALL

Bus.

BUSINESS, CAPITAL FORMATION, AND THE FEDERAL SECURITIES LAWS
CAPrrAL FORMATION].

POLICY,

SEC,

SMALL

4 [hereinafter cited as
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accompanied by a prospectus1 2 containing information required in
the registration statement. 13 If an issuer fails to comply with these
requirements, a purchaser
may demand return of his consideration
14
interest.
accrued
and
In drafting the Securities Act of 1933, Congress recognized that
federal registration was unnecessary under certain circumstances.1 5
Thus, the Act exempts certain classes of securities,16 transactions
by certain individuals not involved in the distribution process,"'
and transactions not involving any public offering." Congress also
empowered the SEC to adopt additional limited exemptions that

are consistent with the public interest and investor protection.

9

The registration exemptions are useful particularly for small businesses that cannot afford registration costs20 and do not require

12. Securities Act of 1933, § 5(b)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 77e(b)(2) (1976).
13. Id. § 10(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77j(a)(1). A prospectus actually contains the descriptive
and financial information required in Part 1 of a registration statement. Certain exhibits
and other information required in a registration statement are omitted from the prospectus.
See id.
14. Id. § 12(1), 15 U.S.C. § 771(1). The right to sue for rescission based on failure to
provide a prospectus is limited to one year from the date of violation by § 13. Id. § 13, 15
U.S.C. § 77m.
15. Id. § 3, 15 U.S.C. § 77c. The registration exemptions apply to federal registration
requirements only. The issuer still must comply with the securities law of each state in
which the securities are offered for sale. Id. § 18, 15 U.S.C. § 77r. The issuer has separate
federal obligations neither to deal fraudulently, id. § 17a, 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a), nor to provide
misleading information, id. § 12(2), 15 U.S.C. § 771(2).
16. Id. § 3(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a).
17. Section 4(1) exempts "transactions by any person other than an issuer, underwriter or
dealer." Sections 4(3) and 4(4) exempt transactions by brokers and dealers subject to certain conditions. Id. § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 77d.
18. Section 4(2) exempts "transactions by an issuer not involving any public offering." Id.
§ 4(2), 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2).
19. Id. § 3(b), 15 U.S.C. § 77c(b). The SEC's rulemaking authority under § 3(b) currently
is limited to offerings up to $5 million. Id. (Supp. IV 1980).
20. The costs of registering a small public offering are estimated to approximate 20% of
the total offering price. Green & Brecher, When Making a Small Public Offering Under
Regulation A (with forms), 26 PRAC. LAW 25, 29 (Mar. 1, 1980). A recent study by the SEC
reported that the average costs for small public offerings were $200 thousand for an average
issue of $1.3 million. See U.S. SEC, RULE 242: A MONITORING REPORT ON THE FIRST Six
MONTHS OF ITS USE 53, Table 18 (Dec. 1980) [hereinafter cited as 242 REPORT]. The greatest
portion of the cost is attributable to underwriter's fees and selling commissions. Id. In addition to the external cost of a public offering, the issuer also must undertake significant internal expenditures including management time, loss of some flexibility in directing the company, and increased liability. OFFICE OF SMALL Bus., OFFICE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, U.S. SEC &
U.S. SBA, Q & A: SMALL BUSINESS AND THE SEC 3 (Mar. 1981). The issuer in a registered

124

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 24:121

access to a broad public market to sell their securities.21
The Nonpublic Offering Exemption Of Section 4(2)22
The most widely used statutory exemption has been the nonpublic offering exemption of section 4(2).2' This section permits an issuer to sell an unlimited amount of unregistered securities if the
offering is not public. 24 The characteristics of a nonpublic offering,
however, have been unclear. In 1935, the General Counsel for the
SEC stated some significant factors in determining whether an issue of securities involves a public offering, including the number of
offerees, the relationship of the offerees to the issuer and to each
other, the manner of offering, the number of units in the offering,
and the dollar amount of the offering. 25 The general counsel also
stated that offerings to less than twenty-five persons presumably
do not involve a public offering.2 6
Until 1953, issuers believed that they complied with section 4(2)
by limiting their offerings to twenty-five offerees. 27 In SEC v. Ralston Purina Co.,28 however, the Supreme Court noted that the secoffering also must assume a continuous reporting obligation under the Securities Exchange
Act which costs "from $25,000 to in excess of $100,000 per year." Taylor, Equity Financing
for the Small Business: A Layman's Guide, 20 S. Tax. L.J. 253, 257 (1979).
21. The advantages of registration include access to a wider market of potential investors
for the initial offering, greater flexibility for future financings, and an unrestricted secondary
trading market for the company's shares. CAPITAL FORMATION, supra note 11, at 7. A small
business, especially one that is locally owned, however, does not require the amount of funding that makes access to a broad market essential. Additionally, because investors are likely
to be closely associated with the business, restricted access to a secondary trading market
might not impair the attractiveness of the offering.
22. Securities Act of 1933, § 4(2), 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (1976).
23. Thomforde, Relief for Small Businesses: Two New Exemptions from SEC Registration, 48 TENN. L. REV. 323, 325 (1981). Until the promulgation of Rule 146 in 1974, the only
registration exemptions for an issuer were § 3(a)(11), Regulation A (Reg. A), and § 4(2).
Because Reg. A, a short form registration statement, had a very low dollar ceiling, and §
3(a)(11), the intrastate offering, required that the issuer and all ultimate purchasers reside
in the same state, § 4(2) was the most popular exemption.
24. Securities Act of 1933, § 4(2), 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (1976).
25. 11 Fed. Reg. 10,952 (1935).
26. Id.
27. Coles, Has Securities Law Regulation in the Private Capital Markets Become a Deterrent to Capital Growth: A CriticalReview, 58 MARQ. L. REv. 395, 435-36 (1975).
28. 346 U.S. 119 (1953). In Ralston Purina,the SEC sought to enjoin the sale of unregistered securities by an issuer as nonexempt under § 4(1) (now § 4(2)). Ralston Purina
claimed that sales to "key employees," a select group including artists, clerks, veterinarians,
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tion 4(2) exemption did not depend solely on the number of offerees.2e The Court interpreted the exemption in light of the purpose
of the Securities Act, which is to protect investors by assuring the
availability of relevant information. 0 The Court held that even in
a nonpublic offering each offeree must have "access to the same
kind of information that the act would make available in the form
of a registration statement.""1
Following the Ralston Purina decision, issuers either limited
nonpublic offerings strictly to persons with access to information
comparable to that found in a registration statement, or provided
such information in an offering memorandum.32 In 1971 and 1972,
however, decisions by the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit in Hill York Corp. v. American International
Franchise, Inc.35 and SEC v. Continental Tobacco Co. 3 4 created
and electricians, did not constitute a public offering. Id. at 121. In granting the injunction,
the Supreme Court provided the judicial benchmark for interpreting the nonpublic offering
exemption. The Court construed the § 4(1) exemption in light of the purpose of the Securities Act, noting that "[t]he design of the statute is to protect investors by promoting full
disclosure of information thought necessary to informed investment decisions." Id. at 124.
The Court stated:
The exemption, as we construe it, does not deprive corporate employees, as a
class, of the safeguards of the Act. We agree that some employee offerings may
come within § 4(1), e.g., one made to executive personnel who because of their
position have access to the same kind of information that the act would make
available in the form of a registration statement. Absent such a showing of
special circumstances, employees are just as much a part of the investing "public" as any of their neighbors in the community.
Id. at 125-26 (footnotes omitted).
The Court further stated that "[tihefocus of inquiry should be on the need of the offerees for the protections afforded by registration.The employees here were not shown to have
access to the kind of information which registration would disclose." Id. at 127 (emphasis
added).
Since the Ralston Purina decision, courts and the SEC have maintained that the availability of the nonpublic offering exemption depends on whether every offeree has available
the same information as in a registration statement. See, e.g., Doran v. Petroleum Mgmt.
Corp., 545 F.2d 893 (5th Cir. 1977); 17 C.F.R. § 230.146 (1981) (SEC rule setting information
requirements for nonpublic offerings). Such information may be supplied to offerees by the
issuer, or it may be made available to the offeree through natural channels of access to the
issuer. 545 F.2d at 906-07.
29. 346 U.S. at 125.
30. Id. at 124. See also A.C. Frost & Co. v. Coeur D'Alene Mines Corp., 312 U.S. 38
(1941).
31. 346 U.S. at 125.
32. See Coles, supra note 27, at 436.
33. 448 F.2d 680 (5th Cir. 1971). In Hill York, an offering made to a small number of
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doubts about the application of section 4(2) to anyone other than
company insiders.3 5 Consequently, issuers urged the SEC to articulate objective standards for compliance with the exemption. 6
In 1974 the SEC promulgated Rule 146 as a safe harbor 7 under
section 4(2)." Under Rule 146, an issuer could meet its disclosure
obligation in a nonpublic offering by providing offerees with a disclosure document.3 9 Unfortunately, Rule 146 did not create entirely objective standards because it required issuers to determine
accurately the wealth or sophistication of every potential offeree,
an inherently risky and subjective determination. 0 Further, full

attorneys and businessmen did not qualify for the § 4(2) exemption because the investors,
although sophisticated, did not have available "the information requisite for a registration
statement .... ." Id. at 690.
34. 463 F.2d 137 (5th Cir. 1972). In Continental Tobacco, the court held that the issuer
claiming an exemption from registration under § 4(2) must prove "that all of the offerees of
Continental enjoyed a relationship with Continental making registration unnecessary." Id.
at 161.
35. D. RATNER, SECURITIEs REGULATION 248 (1980).
36. Id.
37. 17 C.F.R. § 230.146(b) (1981). A "safe harbor" is a rule clarifying a statute. Compliance with the rule is deemed compliance with the statute, and the issuer is safe from future
interpretations that otherwise would expose him to liability. Id.
38. 17 C.F.R. § 230.146 (1981). The preliminary note 3 to the Rule states that "Rule 146
is designed to provide, to the extent feasible, objective standards upon which responsible
businessmen may rely in raising capital under claim of the Section 4(2) exemption." Id.
39. Id. § 230.146(e)(1) (1981). Subsequent to the promulgation of Rule 146 in 1977, the
Fifth Circuit modified its position in Continental Tobacco and held in Doran v. Petroleum
Mgmt. Corp. that an issuer could qualify for the § 4(2) exemption if the issuer could show
that offerees had access to or had been provided with the necessary information. 545 F.2d
893 (5th Cir. 1977)).
40. Under Rule 146, prior to making an offer, the issuer had to determine that every
offeree either was sophisticated (defined as knowledgeable in financial and business matters), or able to bear the risk of the investment. 17 C.F.R. § 230.146(d)(1) (1981). An offer
made to a single unqualified offeree caused the exemption under Rule 146 to be lost and
presumably also violated § 4(2). 17 C.F.R. § 230.146, prelim. n.3 (1981). The entire offering,
therefore, was in violation of § 5, and every holder of the securities had a right to return
them to the issuer for a refund of the issue price. Securities Act of 1933, § 12(1), 15 U.S.C. §
771(1) (1976).
The Securities Act defines very broadly an offer to sell. See Securities Act of 1933, § 2(3),
15 U.S.C. § 77b(3) (1976). Almost any nonroutine communication regarding the issuer or its
securities made without filing a registration statement may be construed as an offer to sell.
22 Fed. Reg. 8,359 (1957). The Rule 146 requirement that the issuer determine the offeree's
qualifications prior to making an offer to sell imposed an unrealistic burden. See Coles,
supra note 27, at 440.
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compliance with Rule 146 was time-consuming and expensive.4 1
During the late 1970's pressure again mounted on Congress and
the SEC to provide relief for businesses forced to choose between
expensive disclosure and a risky exemption.
Recent Actions By Congress and the SEC
In the late 1970's, both Congress and the SEC recognized the
importance of small businesses to the American economy,42 and
the disproportionate impact of registration requirements on the
ability of small businesses to raise capital. 43 Each rulemaking body,
therefore, undertook specific actions to provide relief.
In 1975, the SEC promulgated Rule 240 to provide a new registration exemption for offerings of less than $100 thousand by
closely held issuers."' In 1978 and 1979, the SEC again aided small
41. Campbell, The Plight of Small Issuers Under the Securities Act of 1933: Practical
Foreclosurefrom the Capital Market, 1977 DUKE L.J. 1139, 1156.
42. A recent publication of the SBA reports that small nonfarm businesses account for
58% of U.S. business employment and 39% of the gross national product. Additionally, of
the 13 million nongovernment jobs created between 1969 and 1976, 12 million were created
by small businesses. See FACTS ABOUT SMALL BUSINESS, supra note 3, at 3-4. The SBA also
reports that between 1952 and 1973, small firms "produced four times as many innovations
per research and development dollar as medium-sized firms (defined as those with 1,000 10,000 employees)." Id. at 22.
43. In 1977, the Advisory Committee on Corporate Disclosure reported to the SEC that
its "survey of publicly held companies indicates that the burden of reporting weighs more
heavily on small than large companies." DIRECTORATE OF ECON. AND POLICY ANALYSIS, U.S.
SEC, FORM S-18: A MONITORING REPORT ON THE FIRST EIGHTEEN MONTHS OF ITS USE 5 (Mar.

1981) [hereinafter cited as

FORM

S-18

REPORT].

Assuming that a large business's earnings are greater than those of a small business, and
that the cost of compliance with identical government regulations is approximately equal,
then the burden of compliance with identical government regulations is proportionately
greater for the small business. Thus, the initial appearance of equal treatment in reality

favors large companies.

OFFICE OF CHIEF COUNSEL FOR ADvoc., U.S.
TREATMENT FOR SMALL ENTITIES 2 (Dec. 1980). The fact that small

SBA, BETTER FEDERAL
businesses spend $12.7

billion per year filling out federal, state, and local government forms indicates the magnitude of the problem. FACTS ABOUT SMALL BUSINESS, supra note 3, at 21.
Congress recognized that regulations often favor large entities and in 1980 passed the
Regulatory Flexibility Act, which directed agencies to fit requirements to the scale of the
entity regulated. Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-354, 94 Stat. 1164 (1980)
(codified at 5 U.S.C.A. §§ 601-612 (West Supp. 1980)). For a discussion of the Regulatory
Flexibility Act, see infra note 50 and accompanying text.
44. 17 C.F.R. § 230.240 (1981). Rule 240 allows issuers with less than 100 beneficial owners to sell up to $100,000 in a limited offering free of federal disclosure requirements, provided that the issuer observes federal limitations on commissions, manner of offering, and
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businesses by amending Rule 144 to increase li4uidity of securities
purchased in an exempt offering.45 In 1979, Form S-18, a short
form registration statement, became available for initial public offerings of $5 million or less. 46 Also in 1979, the SEC established the
Office of Small Business Policy within the Division of Corporation
Finance to address the problems of small business issuers.47 In
1980, the SEC promulgated Rule 242 which provided a $2 million
exemption with limited disclosure requirements 48 and introduced

resale. Id.
45. 17 C.F.R. § 230.144 (1981). Rule 144 provides a safe harbor for the resale of restricted
securities when certain conditions are met regarding the availability of public information
about the issuer, id. § 230.144(c), the compliance by the original purchaser with a minimum
holding period, id. § 230.144(d), and the volume of sales by affiliates of the issuer, id. §
230.144(e). A purchaser reselling without registration or compliance with the exemption may
be an underwriter as defined in § 2(11) and is subject to strict liability under § 12(1). Id. §
230.144, prelim. n.2.
In 1978, the SEC amended Rule 144 to permit sales directly to market makers. 43 Fed.
Reg. 43,709, 43,711 (1978). In 1979, the SEC amended Rule 144 to permit nonaffiliates of
the issuer to sell an unlimited amount of securities, provided the other conditions of the
Rule were met. 44 Fed. Reg. 15,610, 15,612 (1979).
46. FoRm S-18 REPORT, supra note 43, at 3. The SEC describes Form S-18 as follows:
In adopting Form S-18, the Commission departed from conventional disclosure practices in order to facilitate small business capital formation. The narrative portion of Form S-18, for example, calls for fewer disclosure items than
does the more generalized Form S-1. The narrative items which are included in
Form S-18, however, are generally consistent with the corresponding items in
Form S-1.
Form S-18 also calls for the presentation of audited financial statements
which correspond substantially to those required in offerings exempt from registration pursuant to Regulation A under the Securities Act of 1933 ("Regulation A"). Financial statements required by Form S-18 are to be prepared in
accordance with generally accepted accounting principles and practices
("GAAP"). Form S-18 requires '(1) a consolidated balance sheet as of the date
within 90 days prior to the date of filing the registration statement; and (2)
consolidated statements of income, source and application of funds, and other
stockholders' equity for the two fiscal years prior to the date of filing. .. .'
In addition, unlike Form S-1, which must be filed at the Commission's headquarters office (in Washington, D.C.), Form S-18 may be filed either at the
headquarters office or at the regional office for the region in which the issuer
conducts (or intends to conduct) its business operations.
Id. at 3-4 (footnotes omitted).
47. FoRM S-18 REPORT, supra note 43, at 6.
48. 17 C.F.R. § 230.242 (1981). Rule 242 provided that certain American and Canadian
corporations could raise up to $2 million every six months in an exempt offering using Form
S-18 as a disclosure document. Id. §§ 230.242(c), .242(f)(1)(i). For offerings made exclusively
to accredited persons, however, the Rule did not require specific disclosures. Id. §
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the concept of "accredited persons," certain investors to whom the
SEC requires no specific disclosure.4 9
In 1980, Congress enacted the Regulatory Flexibility Act 0 and
the Small Business Investment Incentive Act.51 The Regulatory
Flexibility Act (RFA) states that "uniform Federal regulatory and
reporting requirements have in numerous instances imposed unnecessary and disproportionately burdensome demands including
legal, accounting, and consulting costs upon small businesses, small
organizations, and small governmental jurisdictions with limited
resources ... ."52 The RFA thus amends the Administrative Procedure Act5" and requires all federal agencies to evaluate the impact
of their regulations on small entities and consider alternative procedures to lessen the burden of compliance."
Through the Investment Incentive Act, Congress amended the
230.242(f)(1).
49. 242 REPORT, supra note 20, at 6. As defined in Rule 242(a)(1), accredited persons are
commercial banks, insurance companies, certain employee benefit plans, registered investment companies, licensed small business investment companies, anyone purchasing $100
thousand or more of the offered securities within a 60-day period, and any director or executive officer of the issuer. 17 C.F.R. § 230.242(a)(1) (1981).
50. Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-354, 94 Stat. 1164 (1980) (codified
at 5 U.S.C. §§ 601-612 (West Supp. 1980)).
51. Small Business Investment Incentive Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-477, 94 Stat. 2275
(1980). In drafting the Investment Incentive Act, Congress clearly expressed concern for the
adverse impact of securities regulations on the ability of small business to raise capital.
The Committee is well aware of the slowing of the flow of capital to American
enterprise, particularly to smaller, growing businesses, that has occurred in recent years. The importance of these businesses to the American economic system in terms of innovation, productivity, increased competition and the jobs
they create is, of course, critical. Hence, the need to reverse this downward
trend is of compelling public concern. Without doubt, the slowdown that has
occurred is the product of many economic forces quite apart from the costs of
securities regulation-taxes and inflation principal among them-and the Congress has been separately addressing all these factors in a wide variety of ways.
But no undue cost should be shielded from scrutiny. As but one means of dealing with the more general problem, this Bill seeks specifically to reduce some
of the costs of government regulation imposed on the capital-raising process, to
the extent that it can be done without sacrificing necessary investor protection.
H.R. REP. No. 1341, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 20, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 4800, 4802.
52. Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980, § 2(a)(3), 94 Stat. 1164 (1980) (findings and
purposes).
53. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559 (1976).
54. Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980, § 1603, 15 U.S.C.A. § 603 (West Supp. 1981).
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Securities Act in three ways to reduce the registration burden for
small issuers. First, Congress added an exemption, section 4(6),
which allows issuers to sell up to $5 million in securities to accredited investors 55 without incurring specific disclosure obligations. 56
Second, Congress raised the ceiling under which the SEC may create exemptions from $2 million to $5 million.57 Finally, Congress
directed the SEC to work with state securities administrators to
develop a consistent national scheme of securities regulation. 8

55. As defined by the Securities Act, an accredited investor is:
(i) a bank as defined in section 77c(a)(2) of this title whether acting in its
individual or fiduciary capacity; an insurance company as defined in paragraph
(13); an investment company registered under the Investment Company Act of
1940 or a business development company as defined in section 2(a)(48) of that
Act; a Small Business Investment Company licensed by the Small Business
Administration; or an employee benefit plan, including an individual retirement account, which is subject to the provisions of the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act of 1974, if the investment decision is made by a plan
fiduciary, as defined in section 3(21) of such Act, which either a bank, insurance company, or registered investment adviser; or
(ii) any person who, on the basis of such factors as financial sophistication, net
worth, knowledge, and experience in financial matters, or amount of assets
under management qualifies as an accredited investor under rules and regulations which the Commission shall prescribe.
15 U.S.C. § 77b(15) (Supp. IV 1980) (amending Securities Act of 1933, § 2, 15 U.S.C. §
77b(1)-(14) (1976)). Cf. 17 C.F.R. § 230.242 (1981) (definition of accredited person).
56. Section 4(6) provides that the provisions of § 5 shall not apply to
transactions involving offers or sales by an issuer solely to one or more accredited investors, if the aggregate offering price of an issue of securities offered in
reliance on this paragraph does not exceed the amount allowed under section
77c(b) of this title, if there is no advertising or public solicitation in connection
with the transaction by the issuer or anyone acting on the issuer's behalf, and
if the issuer files such notice with the Commission as the Commission shall
prescribe.
15 U.S.C. § 77d(6) (Supp. IV 1980) (amending Securities Act of 1933, § 4(6), 15 U.S.C. §
77(d) (1976)).
57. By increasing substantially the § 3(b) ceiling from $2 million to $5 million, Congress
intended to provide the SEC with greater flexibility to develop rules to meet the investment
needs of small businesses. 45 Fed. Reg. 71,775, 71,776 (1980). See also Note, Rule 242 and
Section 4(6) Securities RegistrationExemption: Recent Attempts to Aid Small Businesses,
23 WM. & MARY L. REv. 73, 88 (1981).
58. Congress amended § 19 of the Securities Act of 1933 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77s) to
add a new § 19(c) which provides in pertinent part: "The Commission is authorized to cooperate with any association of duly constituted representatives of State governments whose
primary assignment is the regulation of the securities business within those States, and
which, in the judgment of the Commission, could assist in effectuating greater uniformity in
Federal-State securities matters." Omnibus Small Business Capital Formation Act of 1980,

1982]

REGULATION D

The steps taken in the last decade by Congress and the SEC
helped create a more favorable environment for financing small
businesses.5 Unfortunately, the result was a "patchwork quilt"
pattern of registration exemptions."0 Reg. D consolidates the scattered exemption
rules and addresses the problems of small
1
6

businesses.

THE STRUCTURE OF REGULATION

D

Reg. D consists of six rules numbered 501 through 506.62 Rules
§ 505, 15 U.S.C. § 77s(c)(1) (Supp. IV 1980).
Because issuers must comply with both federal and state securities laws, uniformity of
laws will help relieve issuers of the burden of multiple filings. IRFA, supra note 3, at 4.
Relaxing the federal rules without coordination with the states would be of limited benefit
to the issuer.
59. The volume of initial public offerings (IPO's) fell precipitously after 1972, and "[o]nly
since 1979 has the IPO volume shown signs of health .... Nevertheless, the recovery,
which can be seen in a comparison of 1979 and 1980 IPO volume, has been dramatic. Overall
volume in 1980 was nearly triple that in 1979 and the number of issues increased 260%."
U.S. SEC & U.S. SBA, THE ROLE OF REGIONAL BROKER-DEALERS IN THE CAPITAL FORMATION
PROCESS: UNDERWRITING, MARKErT-MAKING AND SECURITIES RESEARCH ACTIvITIEs 7, 10 (Aug.
1981) [hereinafter cited as REGIONAL BROKER-DEALERS].
Exempt issues also flourished. During 1979, 477 issuers filed notices of sales on Form 240
aggregating $9,707,205. During 1980, 1,486 issuers filed notices of sales on Form 240 aggregating $14,164,141. 46 Fed. Reg. 2,631, 2,635 (1981).
Rule 242 first became available to issuers in 1980. During the first six months of its availability, 64 issuers filed notices of intended sales aggregating $38,058,704. Id. at 2,636. Moreover, the issuers using Rule 242 were "small when measured by their financial characteristics and number of employees." Id.
60. Thomforde, supra note 23, at 336.
61. 47 Fed. Reg. 11,251 (1982). "The objective of ... Regulation D ... is to coordinate
the various limited offering exemptions and to streamline the existing requirements applicable to private offers and sales of securities thereby creating a more coherent pattern of exemptive relief, particularly as it relates to the capital formation needs of small business."
IRFA, supra note 3, at 3.
62. 47 Fed. Reg. 11,251, 11,262-66 (1982) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 230.501-.506). Six
preliminary notes precede Reg. D and place it within the existing statutory scheme. Id. at
11,253. The preliminary notes provide that securities issued in reliance on Reg. D will be
subject to the same general qualifications that apply to the existing filing exemptions under
§§ 4(2) and 3(b).
Note 1 provides that compliance with Reg. D exempts an issuer from the registration
requirements of § 5 of the Securities Act only. 47 Fed. Reg. 11,251, 11,262 (1982). Compliance with Reg. D, however, does not exempt an issuer from the anti-fraud provisions or the
civil liability provisions of the Act.
Note 2 reminds issuers that Reg. D does not provide an exemption from compliance with
the securities laws of the states. Id. An issuer therefore must comply with the separate registration requirements of each state in which its securities will be sold.
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501 through 503 provide uniform terms and definitions, general
conditions, and a uniform notice of sales form, Form D."5 Rules
504 through 506 replace former rules 240, 242, and 146 respectively." Rule 504 governs offerings up to $500 thousand, Rule 505
governs offerings up to $5 million, and Rule 506 governs offerings
exceeding $5 million.6 5 Each of the former rules had its own definitions, conditions, and notice of sales form; thus, Reg. D simplifies
and unifies the exemptions.
Reg. D encourages capital formation among small businesses by
expanding the concept of accredited investors and raising dollar
ceilings of exemptions."6 Thus, the new regulation increases the opportunity for issuers to make securities offerings with less burdensome disclosure requirements.6 7 For offerings made only to accred-

Note 3 states that attempted compliance with Reg. D does not serve as an election. Id.
Failure to comply exactly with the requirements of Reg. D does not violate the registration
requirements of the Act provided the issue qualifies under another exemption.
Note 4 cautions that the exemption from federal registration requirements under Reg. D
exempts only the issuer. Id. A purchaser reselling securities purchased in a Reg. D offering
without registration or an exemption may be considered as participating in a distribution
and become strictly liable as an underwriter, as defined in § 2(11) of the Act. Securities Act
of 1933, § 2(11), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(11) (1976).
Note 5 provides that these rules may be used for business combinations. 47 Fed. Reg.
11,251, 11,262 (1982).
Note 6 provides that any offering may lose its exempt status, even though in technical
compliance with the rule, if it is part of a scheme to evade the Act's registration requirements. Id.
63. 47 Fed. Reg. 11,251, 11,262-65 (1982) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.501-.503).
64. Id. at 11,266 (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.504-.506, replacing 17 C.F.R. §§
230.240, .242, .146 (1981)).
65. 47 Fed. Reg. at 11,266.
66. Reg. D encourages issuers to make offerings with reduced disclosures. The most significant changes made by Reg. D are:
a) increasing the offering ceiling to $500,000 under Rule 504 and to $5 million
under Rule 505, 47 Fed. Reg. 11,251-52 (1982);
b) expanding the definition of accredited investors relative to former Rule 242
and § 4(6), id. at 12,253;
c) extending the accredited investor concept to offerings in excess of $5 million,
id. at 11,252;
d) permitting noncorporate issuers to make offerings with reduced disclosures
to nonaccredited investors, id. at 11,258;
e) excluding accredited investors from the 35 purchaser limitation of Rules 505
and 506, id.;
f) eliminating the offeree qualification test for large offerings, id.; and
g) permitting issuers to pay sales commissions for offerings under Rule 504, id.
67. Id. at 11,258.
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ited investors 6 and for small offerings made under Rule 504,69 Reg.
D requires no specific disclosures. For offerings made under Rule
505, qualified issuers may provide information on a short form disclosure document. 70 For offerings under Rule 506, information
comparable to full registration must be provided only if nonac71
credited investors participate.
Accredited Investors
Accredited investors are purchasers who can "fend for themselves," and to whom the issuer has no specific disclosure obligations. 72 Although the accredited investor concept was not introduced into the Securities Act until 1980,"3 the SEC has expanded
the concept tremendously in Reg. D, extending it to offerings by
partnerships and to offerings exceeding $5 million. 4
The accredited investor concept in Reg. D benefits issuers in numerous ways. First, the expanded concept makes Reg. D exemptions more advantageous to issuers than exemptions under the
prior rules. Rule 146 did not contain an accredited investor concept. Rule 242 contained a narrower definition of "accredited per-

68. Id. at 11,264 (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(b)(1)(i)).
69. Id.
70. Id. (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(b)(2)(i)(4)). When nonaccredited investors
participate in an offering under Rules 505 and 506, the issuer assumes disclosure obligations
to all purchasers. Id. (to be codified at 17 C.F:R. § 230.502(b)(1)(ii)). Companies required to
report under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 must provide all purchasers with the information required to be filed under that Act. Id. (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. §
230.502(b)(2)(ii)). The disclosure obligation for non-Exchange Act companies varies according to the amount of the offering. Id. (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(b)(2)(i)). Additionally, all issuers must describe any written information that they have provided to accredited investors and make it available to purchasers upon request. Id. at 11,265 (to be
codified at 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(b)(2)(ii)).
71. Id. at 11,264-65 (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(b)(2)(i)(B)).
72. Note, supra note 57, at 82.
73. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.242(a)(1) (1981). The accredited investor concept in Rule 242 was
an experiment, testing whether exempt offerings without specific disclosure requirements to
certain types of investors could be consistent with investor protection. 45 Fed. Reg. 6,362
(1980).
74. Rule 242 permitted issuers to make offerings of up to $2 million every six months, but
the Rule was limited to American and Canadian corporate issuers. 17 C.F.R. § 230.242(a)(5),
(c) (1981). Section 4(6) had an offering ceiling of $5 million, but permitted no participation
by nonaccredited investors. Securities Act of 1933, § 4(6), 15 U.S.C. § 77d(6) (Supp. IV
1980).
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sons" and limited its application to offerings of $2 million or less.7 5
Additionally, because Reg. D excludes accredited investors in determining the number of purchasers of an offering,7 6 distribution
may be much broader under Reg. D than under Rules 242 or 146.
Another advantage of Reg. D's interpretation of the accredited
investor concept is that an issuer may make offerings pursuant to
Rule 506 to accredited investors in unlimited dollar amounts without incurring any specific disclosure obligations. 78 Therefore, in an
offering made exclusively to accredited investors, an issuer may
avoid some of the printing and accounting costs of preparing certified financial statements, and some of the legal fees associated with
preparing a federal disclosure document.7 9 If any nonaccredited investors participate, however, the issuer assumes significant disclosure obligations to all purchasers.8 0 Consequently, an issuer seeking the least costly method of making an offering should limit
exempt offerings exclusively to accredited investors.
Reg. D defines eight categories of accredited investors.8 1 Only
three of these categories existed under Rule 242, each of which has
been expanded. The category of accredited institutional investors
under Rule 242 was comprised of banks, insurance companies, registered investment companies, and other financial institutions.2
Reg. D expands this category to include business development
companies as defined by the Investment Company Act. 3 To be accredited under Reg. D, however, a business development company
must provide significant managerial assistance to the issuer.8 4 The

75. 17 C.F.R. § 230.242(c) (1981).
76. 47 Fed. Reg. 11,251, 11,263 (1982) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(e)(1)(iv)).
77. See infra notes 272-75 and accompanying text for a discussion of calculating the number of purchasers.
78. 47 Fed. Reg. 11,251, 11,264 (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(b)).
79. For offerings registered on Form S-18, for instance, legal, printing, and accounting
fees comprise 95% of the total issuance cost. Of this total, legal fees account for 48%, accounting fees for 23%, and printing costs for 24%. The savings, therefore, in an unregistered offering made solely to accredited investors is likely to be significant. FORM S-18 REPORT, supra note 43, at 29, Table 7.
80. 47 Fed. Reg. 11,251, 11,264 (1982) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(b)(1)(ii)).
81. Id. at 11,262-63 (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a)(1)-(8)).
82. 17 C.F.R. § 230.242(a)(1) (1981).
83. 47 Fed. Reg. 11,251, 11,262 (1982) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a)(1)). See
also Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(48) (Supp. IV 1980).
84. Unlike Rule 242(a)(1), Reg. D includes business development companies as accredited
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class of accredited institutions now also includes Employee Retirement Income Security Act85 (ERISA) plans with assets over $5
million. 6 Previously, only ERISA plans with a financial institution
as the plan fiduciary had an accredited status. 87 The Commission
modified this definition to give accredited status to large plans
with internalized investment responsibility.8
Under Reg. D, directors, executive officers, and general partners
of the issuer are accredited investors.8" Rule 242 did not allow general partners of an issuer to be accredited investors. Because Reg.
D removes this limitation, the general partners of issuers and the
directors, executive officers, and general partners of a general partner of issuers also are accredited investors. 90 These insiders do not
need the protection of a registration statement because their positions provide them with access to information about the issuer and
the securities offered.
Reg. D contains a third category of accredited investor which
originated in Rule 242. Rule 242 defined purchasers of $100 thousand or more as accredited persons because they possessed sufficient economic leverage with the issuer to demand any necessary
information."1 The purchaser, however, had to discharge his payment obligation within sixty days.' 2 The SEC modified this requirement in Reg. D to permit payment by installments.93 Purchasers who commit to pay $150 thousand within five years are
accredited investors if their total commitment is less than twenty
investors "to encourage the contributions venture capitalists may make to the capital formation process by investing in and providing managerial assistance to small, growing businesses." 46 Fed. Reg. 41,791, 41,796 n.17 (1981).
85. An ERISA plan is an "employee benefit plan within the meaning of Title I of the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974." 47 Fed. Reg. 11,251, 11,262 (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a)(1)).
86. 47 Fed. Reg. 11,251, 11,262 (1982) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a)(1)). See id.
at 11,254 (discussing ERISA plans as accredited investors).
87. 17 C.F.R. § 230.242(a)(1)(i) (1981).
88. 47 Fed. Reg. 11,251, 11,254 (1982).
89. Id. at 11,262-63 (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a)(4)).
90. Id.
91. 17 C.F.R. § 230.242(a)(1)(ii) (1981). See generally Note, supra note 57, at 89.
92. 17 C.F.R. § 230.242(a)(1)(ii)(1981).
93. Purchases made by installment payments do not extend the sales period of an offering
for purposes of integration or the filing requirements of Form D. 47 Fed. Reg. 11,251, 11,254
n.13 (1982).
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percent of their net worth. 4 Presumably, the minimum purchase
requirement guarantees that these investors have access to information, and the twenty percent floor assures they are able to bear
the risk of the investment. Because wealthy natural persons have
less restrictive alternative means of accreditation, this category will
be comprised primarily of private businesses.9 5
The five new categories of accredited investors introduced in Reg
D consist of two categories of natural persons and three categories
of institutions. The new categories of natural persons are controversial because natural persons previously could not be accredited
investors unless they also had access to information as insiders or
they purchased $100 thousand worth of an issue within sixty
days. 6 Under the new regulation, natural persons are accredited
investors if they have a net worth of at least $1 million 97 or have
income in excess of $200 thousand for each of the past two years. e8
Wealthy individuals, therefore, may be accredited investors even if
they invest less than $150 thousand in an unregistered offering and
lack access to information. By not requiring specific disclosures to
these investors under Reg. D, the SEC seems to violate the access
requirements of Ralston Purina." Affluent but financially unsophisticated individuals also may invest more than twenty percent

94. Id. at 11,263 (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a)(5)).
95. See infra notes 266-72 and accompanying text for a discussion of the $150 thousand
purchaser category.
96. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.242(a)(1) (1981). These new categories open a tremendous source
of private financing to issuers without imposing specific disclosure requirements by equating
personal wealth with financial sophistication and access to information. These categories
also potentially deprive many wealthy but unsophisticated investors of the protection of the
Securities Act. The caveat of SEC Commissioner Loomis prior to the adoption of the Small
Business Investment Incentive Act of 1980 still is appropriate: "[R]emoving investor protections too broadly or precipitously could ultimately have negative effects on the ability of
small businesses to raise capital if investor dissatisfaction results in lost confidence in the
securities." Small Business Investment Incentive Act of 1979: Hearings on H.R. 3991
Before the Subcomm. on Consumer Protectionand Finance of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 35 (1979) (statement of Philip A. Loomis, Jr., Commissioner, SEC). For a discussion of access to information for accredited investors, see infra notes 97-110 and accompanying text.
97. 47 Fed. Reg. 11,251, 11,263 (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a)(6)).
98. Id. at 11,263 (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a)(7)). Accredited investors also
must reasonably expect to earn more than $200 thousand in the current year. Id.
99. See supra note 28 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Ralston Purina
holding.
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of their wealth without the ability to bear the risk of their investment. Formerly, Rule 146 protected investors by requiring issuers
to ascertain an investor's financial sophistication and his ability to
bear the risk of loss. 00 Reg. D sacrifices much of this protection to
facilitate capital formation.101
The three new categories of institutions defined as accredited investors are: (1) entities wholly owned by accredited investors; 02 (2)
private business development companies 03 as defined in the Investment Advisors Act;104 and (3) tax exempt organizations with
assets in excess of $5 million. 105 Entities that are wholly owned by
accredited investors have accredited status because their investment decisions are made by persons for whom formal disclosure is
unnecessary.10o Private business development companies are accredited investors if they participate in management because they
100. 17 C.F.R. § 230.146(d)(2)(i), (ii) (1981).
101. Accredited natural persons are likely to be the primary source of financing for small
businesses. A recent SBA study reports that the median investment size for informal investors is between $10 thousand and $25 thousand. W. WETZEL, JR., & C. SEYMOUR, INFORMAL
RISK CAPITAL IN NEW ENGLAND 16 (1981) [hereinafter cited as INFORMAL RISK CAPITAL].
Small informal investments, however, have greater than average risk. The SBA reports that
55% of businesses that fail do so within the first five years. FACTS ABOUT SMALL BUSINESS,
supra note 3, at 3. Small businesses are likely to obtain financing through informal offerings,
however, because small businesses have less capacity to finance growth through retained

earnings and depreciation than do mature corporations.

REGIONAL BROKER-DEALERS,

supra

note 59, at 7. Small businesses are also at a disadvantage in bank borrowings, 1 SBA ANNUAL REP. 7, Table 2 (1980), and may not have audited financial statements for the benefit
of investors. See 46 Fed. Reg. 41,791, 41,801 (1981).
The presumption underlying the two categories of natural persons is that wealthy individuals do not need the protection provided by a registration statement. This presumption is
tenuous. Investor protection should require the issuer to determine that wealthy individuals
also are sophisticated, at least until the SEC can demonstrate with a high degree of certainty that wealth alone assures financial sophistication and access to needed financial
information.
102. 47 Fed. Reg. 11,251, 11,263 (1982) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a)(8)).
103. Id. (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a)(2)). This category of accredited investors
differs from the business development companies included in Rule 501(a)(1), which must
elect not to be regulated under the Investment Company Act of 1940. Private business development companies generally will be smaller in size, yet they must provide the issuer with
"significant managerial assistance" as defined in § 2(a)(47) of the Investment Company Act
of 1940. Id. at 11,251, 11,254.
104. Investment Advisors Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1 to -20 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
105. 47 Fed. Reg. 11,251, 11,262 (1982) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a)(3)).
106. Id. at 11,251, 11,264 (1982) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(b)(1)(i)). To require
disclosure to an entity owned entirely by accredited investors would unnecessarily burden
the issuer because none of the beneficiaries need formal disclosure. See id.
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have access to information about the issuer. Granting accredited
status to business development companies enables small businesses
to benefit from the companies' managerial expertise without the
10 7
burden of preparing disclosure documents.

Large tax exempt organizations are considered accredited investors because they are similar to the financial institutions covered
by Rule 242.108 Large tax exempt organizations presumably make
sophisticated financial decisions and can bear the investment risk.
Like nondisclosure to wealthy individuals, however, not requiring
specific disclosures to these investors also may violate the Ralston
Purina'09 holding, because such organizations may not have access
to necessary information.""
Expanding the accredited investor concept, then, significantly
increases the ability of small businesses to raise capital in exempt
offerings. By expanding the categories of accredited investors, however, the SEC created the possibility that large amounts of securities may be sold to wealthy yet financially unsophisticated persons
who lack access to information comparable to that given in a registration statement."' Nevertheless, the rules defining accredited in107. Poor management causes 92% of all small business failures. FAcTs ABOUT SMALL
BUSINESS, supra note 3, at 3. Issuers now are more likely to reap the benefit of outside
managerial assistance, because Reg. D includes private business development companies
within its definition of accredited investors. 47 Fed. Reg. 11,251, 11,262 (to be codified at 17
C.F.R. § 230.501(a)(2)). Professional venture capital companies often are not interested in
small offerings, see INFORMAL RISK CAPITAL, supra note 101, at 32; therefore, this category of
accredited investors may be comprised primarily of small consulting teams offering management assistance and investing less than $150 thousand.
108. 47 Fed. Reg. 11,251, 11,262 (1982) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a)(3)). As
first proposed, this category of accredited investors was limited to college and university
endowment funds with assets exceeding $25 million. 46 Fed. Reg. 41,791, 41,803 (1981).
Upon further consideration, however, the SEC decided to enlarge the category and lower the
minimum assets requirement to $5 million. 47 Fed. Reg. 11,251, 11,254 (1982).
109. See supra notes 28-30 and accompanying text.
110. Access to information depends on "position" relative to the issuer, not on income
and wealth of the purchaser. 17 C.F.R. § 230.146(e) (1981). Large charities which do not
purchase a significant part of an exempt offering may be in no position to insist upon specific disclosures. Presumably, however, large charities are both sophisticated and able to
bear the risk. These factors alone do not provide protection without access as specified
under the Ralston Purinastandard. See supra notes 28-30 and accompanying text.
111. Of the eight categories of accredited investors, only insiders, 47 Fed. Reg. 11,251,
11,262 (1982) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a)(4)), business development companies,
id. (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(1)(2)), and $150 thousand purchasers, id. (to be
codified at 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(5)), hold a position relative to the issuer which would pro-
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vestor status do not exempt issuers from the anti-fraud1 12 or civil
liability113 provisions of the Securities Act, or from state disclosure
requirements." 4 Thus, the necessity of compliance with these provisions and requirements may mitigate possible risk to investors.
Offerings to $500 Thousand - Rule 504
Rule 504 of Reg. D replaces Rule 240. Neither rule specifies the
information that an issuer must disclose in an offering, but Rule
504 raises the Rule 240 offering ceiling from $100 thousand to $500
thousand. 1 5 Because issuers making offerings for under $500 thousand primarily are issuers for whom the cost of compliance with
federal disclosure requirements imposes an unreasonable burden,

vide access to information. Financial institutions, id. (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. §
230.501(a)(1)), and large charities, id. (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(3)), presumably
are both sophisticated and able to bear the risk. Affluent individuals, id. at 11,263 (to be
codified at 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.501(a)(6)-(7)), in most instances may be presumed able only to
bear the risk and not to have financial sophistication.
112. Section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933 provides that:
It shall be unlawful for any person in the offer or sale of any securities by
the use of any means or instruments of transportation or communication in
interstate commerce or by the use of the malls, directly or indirectly(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, or
(2) to obtain money or property by means of any untrue statement of a
material fact or any omission to state a material fact necessary in order
to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under
which they were made, not misleading, or
(3) to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business which
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser.
Securities Act of 1933, § 17(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77(2)(a) (1976).
113. Section 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933 provides in part that any person who:
offers or sells a security. . . by means of a prospectus or oral communication,
which includes an untrue statement of a material fact or omits to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading. . . shall be liable to the
person purchasing such security from him, who may sue either at law or in
equity in any court of competent jurisdiction, to recover the consideration paid
for such security with interest thereon, less the amount of any income received
thereon, upon the tender of such security, or for damages if he no longer owns
the security.
Securities Act of 1933, § 12(2), 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1976).
114. Securities Act of 1933, § 18, 15 U.S.C. § 77r (1976). See also supra note 62.
115. Compare 47 Fed. Reg. 11,251, 11,264 (1982) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. §
230.502(b)(1)(i)) (referring to Rule 504) with 17 C.F.R. § 230.240(e) (1981) (referring to Rule
240).
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the SEC believes that an exemption from registration for such
small offerings is appropriate.1 1
As under Rule 240, state securities law primarily would govern
offerings under Rule 504.11 Consequently, many small and growing
businesses may acquire initial financing by complying with state
disclosure requirements alone.1 1 8 State securities administrators
can regulate small offerings efficiently because they are familiar
with the circumstances of local issuers and can respond to their
inquiries quickly. 1 " Presumably, investors also will be protected by
their own familiarity with issuers of small offerings. 12 0 Offerings
116. This belief is supported by a recent SBA financed independent study that reported:
The severe effects of cost-inefficient federally mandated financial disclosure are
most pronounced among smaller firms. It is generally acknowledged that the
costs of compliance with reporting requirements are both large in absolute
terms and relatively more burdensome for smaller companies. For instance, in
a study prepared for the SEC and Congress, the Advisory Committee on Corporate Disclosure reported that the costs involved in preparing and filing a
Form 10-K are typically on the order of $2.41 per $100,000 of sales for 'large'
(sales in excess of $1 billion) companies, $3.21 per $100,000 of sales for 'medium' (sales of $100 million to $1 billion) companies, and $121.41 per $100,000
of sales for 'small' (sales of less than $100 million) firms; for Form 10-Q, the
annual costs per $100,000 of sales are comparable: $1.08 for large companies,
$2.56 for medium companies, and $123.48 for small companies. So the smallest
firms and their shareholders bear the highest proportionate costs, first because
the costs are relatively larger by any financial measure, and second because the
costs are divided among fewer owners. This inequity is particularly unfortunate considering the fragile financial situation of many small companies and
the importance of the small business sector as a major source of new jobs, new
markets, new products, new industries, and technical and commercial
innovations.
A.E.

OSBORNE

ASSOCIATES, ASSET

SIZE AND ALTERNATIVE POLICY CRITERIA IN SECURITIES REG-

2-3 (Dec. 1981) (footnotes omitted) [hereinafter cited as OSBORNE STUDY].
117. Depending on the requirements of each state in which the issue is sold, the resulting
burden on issuers may be more or less comparable to federal regulation. By removing the
requirement for federal registration, the Rule eliminates the hardship of duplicate requirements when unnecessary to protect investors. IRFA, supra note 3, at 4. The SEC agreed
with the commentators that a need existed for a de minimis exemption from federal regulation. 46 Fed. Reg. 41,791, 41,801 (1982).
118. 47 Fed. Reg. 11,251-52 (1982). "Because of the small amount of the offering and the
likelihood that sales will occur in a limited geographic area, the Commission and NASAA
[North American Securities Administrators Association] believe that greater reliance on
state securities laws is appropriate." Id.
119. A recent SEC study on the use of Form S-18 indicates that agency response time to
issuer filings has decreased due to regional report filing. FORM S-18 REPORT, supra note 43,
at 38. A similar efficiency should exist for filings with the states.
120. Compare 47 Fed. Reg. 11,251-52 (1982) with 39 Fed. Reg. 2353 (1974) (investor proULATION
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made in states requiring that a registration statement be filed and
that a prospectus be delivered are exempt from federal restrictions
on the manner of offering and resales as well as from disclosure."'
In addition to raising the $100 thousand ceiling to $500 thousand, Rule 504 modifies Rule 240 in other significant aspects. Rule
504 removes the Rule 240 prohibition against paying commissions
for solicitation of offers and sales.1 22 Consequently, small busi-

nesses seeking to raise capital now can seek the assistance of securities professionals experienced in structuring exempt offerings.12
Solicitation also is beneficial to the issuer because the connection
made between the small issuer and the clients of a broker-dealer
significantly expands the issuer's market. 24 Unlike Rule 240, Rule
504 is limited to issuers not required to report under the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934,125 instead of to issuers with fewer than 100
beneficial owners. This new standard relates directly the disclosure
requirements of the Securities Act to the size and ability of the
issuer to comply without incurring unreasonable expense. 2 ' These
tection in intrastate offerings).
121. 47 Fed. Reg. 11,251, 11,266 (1982) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 230.504(b)(1)). When
the state requires delivery of prospectus and registration, the SEC assumes the existence of
adequate investor protection. 46 Fed. Reg. 41,791, 41,801 (1981). If the states exempt offerings made under Rule 504, the federal restrictions on resale and manner of offering still
apply because investors have not received a prospectus. Commentators contend, however,
that when states require delivery of a prospectus, the federal exemption of Rule 504 should
be increased above $500 thousand to reflect the additional protection of investors. Letter
from ABA to SEC (Nov. 11, 1981) (Public File # S7-891) (commenting on proposed Reg. D).
122. 47 Fed. Reg. 11,251-52 (1982).
123. If the disclosure proves to be inadequate and the issuer becomes insolvent, sales
through a securities professional also create the possibility that a purchaser may recover
damages from the broker. See Securities Act of 1933, § 12(2), 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1976).
124. Small businesses rely primarily on regional broker-dealers to manage their offerings
as was documented recently in a joint study by the SBA and SEC. See generally REGIONAL
BROKER-DEALERS, supra note 59. During the period from 1972-1980, regional broker-dealers
managed 79% of reported initial public offerings. Id. at ii. Regional broker-dealers also
served as the leading market-makers for secondary sales. Id. Small issuers also will probably
rely on regional broker-dealers in making exempt offerings.
125. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). An
issuer is an Exchange Act company for purposes of Reg. D if required to file periodic reports
pursuant to § 13 or § 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act. 47 Fed. Reg. 11,251, 11,264
(1982) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(b)(2)). Exchange Act companies have filed a
registration statement pursuant to either § 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 or
the Securities Act of 1933, or have more than 500 shareholders and more than $1 million in
assets. 15 U.S.C. § 781(g)(1)(B).
126. Under Rule 240, a qualified issuer could be a large company with audited financial
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changes demonstrate that the SEC conceived Rule 504 particularly
27
to assist the capital formation needs of small businesses.
Investment companies 1 8 cannot make offerings under Rule 504
regardless of their size. 129 Investment companies are excluded because they are separately regulated under the Investment Company Act of 1940130 which contains its own registration exemptions.131 Including investment companies under Rule 504 might
subject them to inconsistent obligations. 32 Similarly, companies
required to file specific disclosure documents under the 1934
Act,. 3 3 should not be permitted to make offerings under Rule
information provided the company had fewer than 100 owners. 17 C.F.R. § 230.240(0
(1981). A recent study reports that "the number of shareholders appears to bear very little
relationship to asset size." OSBORNE STUDY, supra note 116, at 7. By limiting Rule 504 to
companies that are not required to provide information under the Securities Exchange Act,
the SEC creates a more direct relationship between the small issue disclosure exemption
and the issuer's ability to provide information. See 47 Fed. Reg. 11,251, 11,266 (1982) (to be
codified at 17 C.F.R. § 230.504(a)).
127. Rule 504 requires only that sales made pursuant to § 3(b) or in violation of § 5(a) be
aggregated toward the $500 thousand limit. 47 Fed. Reg. 11,251, 11,266 (1982) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 230.504(a), (b)(2)). Rule 240 required the aggregation of every unregistered offering but did not aggregate sales to certain company insiders. 17 C.F.R. §
230.240(b)(ii) (1981). Therefore, the impact of this change is uncertain. See infra notes 19599 and accompanying text.
128. An investment company is one which:
(1) is or holds itself out as being engaged primarily, or proposes to engage primarily, in the business of investing, reinvesting, or trading in securities;
(2) is engaged or proposes to engage in the business of issuing face-amount
certificates of the installment type, or has been engaged in such business and
has any such certificate outstanding; or
(3) is engaged or proposes to engage in the business of investing, reinvesting,
owning, holding, or trading in securities, and owns or proposes to acquire investment securities having a value exceeding 40 per centum of the value of
such issuer's total assets (exclusive of Government securities and cash items)
on an unconsolidated basis.
Investment Company Act of 1940, § 3(a), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(a) (1976).
Rules 504 and 505 exclude these issuers because the Investment Company Act of 1940
regulates them separately, and because they have available a special $500 thousand exemption under Regulation E of the Securities Act of 1933. 46 Fed. Reg. 41,791, 41,801 n.36
(1981).
129. 47 Fed. Reg. 11,251, 11,266 (1982) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 230.504(a)).
130. 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to -64 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
131. See supra note 128. In addition to the $500 thousand exemption under Regulation E,
investment companies with fewer than 100 owners have a nonpublic offering exemption
under the Investment Company Act § 3(c), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c) (1976).
132. See 46 Fed. Reg. 41,791, 41,801 n.36 (1981).
133. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-kk (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
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504.'13 Reg. D requires that Exchange Act issuers provide purchas13 5
ers with their Exchange Act documents.
Offerings to $5 Million - Rule 505
Rule 505 replaces Rule 242 and provides disclosure standards for
medium-sized offerings not warranting full registration and disclosure. Rule 505 increases the $2 million per six month ceiling of
Rule 242 to $5 million per year. 136
For an offering under Rule 505 involving nonaccredited investors, issuers required to report under the Exchange Act must provide purchasers with their Exchange Act documents.3 7 Companies
not reporting under the Exchange Act must provide investors with
the same information as specified in Part One of Form S-18, the
short form registration statement. 3 8 If Form S-18 is not available
to the issuer, then the issuer must disclose. the information required by Part One of the registration statement that the issuer is
entitled to use.13 9
Additionally, the issuer must present audited financial statements for the most recent fiscal year if they are available without
unreasonable effort and expense.14' The cost of preparing audited

134. The SEC must regulate disclosure consistently with public interest. Securities Act of
1933, § 3(b), 15 U.S.C. § 77c(b) (1976). Reducing disclosure costs for small businesses is in
the public interest because it facilitates capital formation. If the issuer already has prepared
information, however, the burden of disclosure is slight and the duty to protect the investor
makes exclusion of Exchange Act issuers from specific disclosure obligations inappropriate.
See 46 Fed. Reg. 41,791, 41,801 (1981). Under Reg. D, the disclosure obligation for Exchange
Act companies does not vary with the amount of the offering. 47 Fed. Reg. 11,251, 11,265
(1982) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(b)(2)(ii)).
135. 47 Fed. Reg. 11,251, 11,265 (1982) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(b)(2)(ii)).
136. Id. at 11,266 (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 230.505).
137. Id. at 11,251, 11,264 (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(b)(2)(ii)(A)).
138. Id. (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(b)(2)(i)(A)). Only American and Canadian
corporations that previously have not made a registered offering may use Form S-18, excluding companies with significant oil and gas operations. 17 C.F.R. § 239.28(a)(1)-(5)
(1981). The SEC plans to make Form S-18 available to more issuers, but probably will
maintain its limitation to first time issuers of less than $5 million. 46 Fed. Reg. 41,791,
41,794 (1981). For a discussion of Form S-18, see supra note 46.
139. 47 Fed. Reg. 11,251, 11,264 (1982) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(b)(2)(i)(A)).
140. The standard for determining what is unreasonable effort and expense is not clear,
but presumably depends on surrounding facts and circumstances. One commentator reported that a first time audit would cost $25 thousand and take 45 days to complete. Letter
from Pillsbury, Madison, Sutro to SEC (Oct. 26, 1981) (commenting on Reg. D) (public file
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financial statements can be a significant burden to a relatively
young or closely-held company that previously neither has sought
external funding nor kept audited financial statements. 141 The
SEC is of the opinion, however, that allowing unaudited statements to be used as disclosure documents under Rules 505 and 506
is inconsistent with investor protection. 142 If the cost of providing
audited financial statements is unreasonable, issuers other than
limited partnerships may provide financial statements for which
only the balance sheet has been audited within 120 days prior to
the offering. 43 Limited partnerships may supply investors with
financial statements prepared for federal income tax purposes if
obtaining audited financial statements would be unreasonable,4
but the partnership's financial statements must45 be reported by a
certified or an independent public accountant.L
Prior to Reg. D, an issuer could make an offering of less than
$1.5 million pursuant to Rules 242, 146, or Reg. A.' 46 Rule 146 and
Reg. A each used the Reg. A offering circular, comparable in detail
to Form S-18, 4 7 as a disclosure document for offerings under $1.5
million. 148 Under Rule 242 a qualified issuer could make offerings
49
of up to $2 million using Form S-18 as a disclosure document.
Rule 505, therefore, does not change the disclosure burden signifi-

# S7-891).

141. A recent SEC report indicated that the mean accounting fee for an issue under Rule
242 was approximately 10% of the total cost of the offering. See 242 REPORT, supra note 20,
at 56. With Form S-18, the mean accounting fee comprised 23% of total offering costs.
FORM S-18 REPORT, supra note 43, at 29.
142. 46 Fed. Reg. 41,791, 41,798 (1981).
143. 47 Fed. Reg. 11,251, 11,264 (1982) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(b)(ii)(2)(A)).
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Reg. A currently has a $1.5 million ceiling, 17 C.F.R. § 230.254(a)(1)(i) (1981); Rule
146 had no ceiling, 17 C.F.R. § 230.146 (1981); Rule 242 permitted sales of $2 million every
six months. 17 C.F.R. § 230.242(c) (1981).
147. The public accounting firm of Deloitte, Haskins & Sells stated in a letter to the SEC
that the specific information requirements of Form IA and Form S-18 are "almost identical." Letter from Deloitte, Haskins & Sells to SEC (Oct. 5, 1981) (public file # S7-891).
148. Rule 256 requires the use of Schedule I of Form 1A as an offering circular for Reg. A.
17 C.F.R. § 230.256(g) (1981). Amended Rule 146 allows use of the Reg. A disclosure document for offerings below $1.5 million. 17 C.F.R. § 230.146(e)(1)(ii)(d) (1981).
149. 17 C.F.R. § 230.242(f) (1981). Unlike offerings made under Reg. A or Rule 146, Form
S-18 provides no waiver of the requirement to provide certified financial statement information even in cases of undue hardship. See supra note 46.
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cantly for these issuers. Rule 146 and Reg. A were more flexible
than Rule 505, however, because they permitted use of unaudited
financial statements in cases of unreasonable effort or expense. 150
Rule 242 was less flexible because it did not allow an issuer to present only an audited balance sheet if auditing costs were unreasonable.15 1 Prior to Reg. D, Rule 146 governed exempt offerings between $2 million and $5 million.15 2 Rule 146 required disclosure in
more detail than did Form S-18, but still permitted an issuer to
153
avoid the cost of auditing.
Investment companies and "unworthy issuers," those with questionable securities records as defined by Reg. A, may not use Rule
505.25 Conspicuously absent, however, are the prohibitions included in Rule 242 on use by partnerships, foreign corporations,
and companies with significant oil and gas operations.1 55 Successful
use of limited disclosure requirements under Rule 242 led the SEC
to make Rule 505 more widely available to small businesses regardless of organization form. 56
Offerings Exceeding $5 Million - Rule 506
Offerings either in excess of $5 million or by issuers unable to
use Rules 504 and 505 may be exempt under Rule 506. Prior to
Reg. D, Rule 146 covered exempt offerings in excess of $5 mil150. Compare 17 C.F.R. § 230.146(e)(1)(b)(2) (1981) and 17 C.F.R. § 230.256 (Schedule I
(11)) (1981) with 47 Fed. Reg. 11,251, 11,264 (1982) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. §
230.502(b)(2)(A)) (discussing requirements for providing audited financial statements).
151. 17 C.F.R. § 230.242(f)(1)(i) (1981). Rule 242 requires that the financial statements

for the issuer's most recent fiscal year be audited.
152. After 1980, exempt offerings up to $5 million could be made under § 4(6), but only to

accredited investors (institutions). Securities Act of 1933, § 4(6), 15 U.S.C. § 77d(6) (Supp.
IV 1980). Rule 147 also provides a narrow exemption without a dollar ceiling when the issuer and all participants reside in the same state. 17 C.F.R. § 230.147(a) (1981).

153. See supra note 46 (discussion of form S-18). Rule 146 required the issuer to provide
"the same kind of information that is specified in Schedule A of the Act," which is
equivalent to a full registration statement. 17 C.F.R. § 230.146(e)(1) (1981).
154. Rule 505 excludes "unworthy issuers," as defined by Rule 252 of Reg. A. 47 Fed. Reg.
11,251, 11,266 (1982) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 230.505(b)(2)(iii)). These issuers have
participated in questionable securities practices within the preceding five years. 17 C.F.R. §
230.252(c)-(f) (1981).
155. 47 Fed. Reg. 11,251, 11,266 (1982) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 230.505(a),
(b)(2)(iii)); 17 C.F.R. § 230.242(a)(5) (1981).
156. 46 Fed. Reg. 41,791, 41,801 (1981). The inclusion of limited partnerships will be valuable, especially for real estate developments and oil and gas ventures. Id.
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lion. 157 Rule 506 has several advantages over Rule 146 for issuers.
Most significantly, in Rule 506 the SEC extended the accredited
investor concept to large offerings. Consequently, Rule 506 allows
more investors to participate in an exempt offering, 158 and enables
an issuer to raise unlimited amounts of capital without specific disclosure requirements. Under Rule 146, only persons with access to
information could purchase securities without receiving specific
59
disclosures.1
Like Rule 146, the issuer under Rule 506 must evaluate the
financial sophistication of nonaccredited investors. 6 0 The issuer's
duty, however, is less burdensome than under Rule 146, which required the issuer to evaluate the wealth or sophistication of each
prospective offeree. 161 By requiring evaluation of purchasers alone,
Rule 506 eliminates the primary source of uncertainty for issuers
of large exempt offerings. 6 2 Rule 146 also required the issuer to
determine that every purchaser either was financially sophisticated
or had a purchaser representative,' 6 3 and could bear the economic
risk of the investment."" Under Rule 506, the issuer must deter-

157. 17 C.F.R. § 230.146 (1981) (excluding exempt offerings under Rule 147, 17 C.F.R. §
230.147 (1981)). See infra notes 253 & 254 for a discussion of the limitations of Rule 147.
158. 47 Fed. Reg. 11,251, 11,266 (1982) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 230.506(b)(2)). See
infra notes 174-85 and accompanying text for a discussion of calculating the number of
purchasers.
159. 17 C.F.R. § 230.146(e)(1)(i) (1981).
160. Rule 506, unlike Rule 146, does not require issuers to evaluate offeree qualifications.
47 Fed. Reg. 11,251, 11,258 (1982) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 230.506). Rule 506, however,
requires the issuer to evaluate purchaser sophistication. Id. at 11,266 (to be codified at 17
C.F.R. § 230.506(b)(2)(iii). Rule 505 protects purchasers indirectly without requiring a purchaser sophistication test by prohibiting unworthy issuers from offering securities under
that Rule. Id. at 11,266 (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 230.505(b)(2)(iii)).
161. 17 C.F.R. § 230.146(d)(2) (1981).
162. The requirement of ascertaining every offeree's wealth and sophistication under Rule
146 created uncertainty by making the exemption contingent on subjective evaluation of
offeree qualifications made prior to each offer. For a discussion of offeree qualifications
under Rule 146, see supra note 40 and accompanying text.
163. A purchaser representative is an investment advisor with the ability to evaluate the
risk of a financial investment, employed by an investor as his representative for a given
offering. 47 Fed. Reg. 11,251, 11,264 (1982) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(b)). Reg.
D's definition of "purchaser representative" is the same as Rule 146's definition of "offeree
representative," with the word "purchaser" substituted for the word "offeree." See 17
C.F.R. § 230.146(a)(1) (1981).
164. 17 C.F.R. § 230.146(d) (1981). Rule 506 retains this protection, at least indirectly, by
requiring the issuer reasonably to believe that purchasers either are sophisticated or have a
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mine whether each purchaser is financially sophisticated or has a
purchaser representative, not whether a purchaser can bear possible economic loss. Such an evaluation provides more certainty than
the evaluation required under Rule 146.165
As in Rule 505, when nonaccredited investors participate in an
offering under Rule 506, Exchange Act company issuers must provide all investors with the documents filed under that act.'" NonExchange Act issuers must provide all investors with the same
kind of information described in Part One of whatever registration
form the issuer is entitled to use. 167 Most issuers under Rule 506
must provide information on a form more detailed than Form S-18
under Rule 505, which is limited to certain issuers who have never
made a registered offering. 168 Although this provision is identical to

that contained in Rule 146,19 the SEC's recent simplification of
the basic registration forms has lessened the issuer's disclosure
burden. 170 If both accredited and nonaccredited investors participate, the issuer, on request, must provide to nonaccredited investors a summary of all written information given to accredited
investors.171
purchaser representative. 47 Fed. Reg. 11,251, 11,266 (1982) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. §
230.506(b)(2)(ii)). This requirement encourages issuers to make offerings under Rule 506
through broker-dealers who qualify as purchaser representatives and who have an independent duty to determine the suitability of their clients' investments. 46 Fed. Reg. 41,791,
41,799 (1981).
165. Compare 47 Fed. Reg. 11,251, 11,266 (1982) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. §
230.506(b)(2)(ii)) with 17 C.F.R. § 230.146(d)(2) (1981) (purchaser qualification
requirements).
166. 47 Fed. Reg. 11,251, 11,264 (1982) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(b)(2)(B)(ii)).
167. Id. (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(b)(2)(B)).
168. Because Regulation T, 12 C.F.R. § 220.1-.130 (1981), prohibits the use of installment
sales for offerings not exempted by § 4(2) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. 77d(2)
(1976), issuers desiring to use installment payments for an offering of less than $5 million
might use Form S-18 under Rule 506, if they are not Exchange Act companies. 12 C.F.R. §
220.7(a)(2) (1981). Most issuers under Rule 506, however, must provide information on a
form more detailed than Form S-18, which is used for offerings under Rule 505.
169. 17 C.F.R. § 230.146(e)(1) (1981).
170. 47 Fed. Reg. 11,449-57 (1982) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 239.11-.13). See also id.
at 11,380, 11,382-83 (1982).
171. 47 Fed. Reg. 11,251, 11,265 (1982) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(b)(2)(iv)).
This provision has two problems. First, compliance will be difficult because the transfer of
information between an accredited investor and an issuer occurs on numerous occasions
over a long period of time. To ask the issuer to summarize formally all written communications and disclose the summary to nonaccredited investors may be unreasonably

148
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If possible, financial statements under Rule 506 must be audited,
which may increase the expense to some issuers. 7 Issuers that
cannot provide audited financial statements have the same alternatives as under Rule 505. Limited partnerships may provide the
financial statements prepared for their federal tax return if accompanied by an auditor's report. All other issuers may provide
financial statements with only balance sheets audited. 17 3
General Limitations on Offerings
The Number of Purchasers
The issuer reasonably must believe that no more than thirty-five
purchasers participate in an offering under Rules 505 and 506.174
This is the same number of purchasers permitted under Rules 146
and 242.'1 5 For offerings under Rule 504, an unlimited number of
purchasers may participate.17 6 This expands the limits of Rule 240,
burdensome.
Second, this provision presents a strong incentive for the issuer not to include both accredited and nonaccredited investors in the same offering to avoid doubling his disclosure
obligations. In an offering sold to both accredited and nonaccredited investors, the issuer
must disclose to all purchasers not only the information provided to accredited investors,
but also the information that the rule requires him to disclose to nonaccredited purchasers.
The issuer also must provide to each purchaser an opportunity to ask questions and receive answers concerning the offering. Id. at 11,265 (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. §
230.502(b)(2)(v)). This provision probably can be satisfied by noting the opportunity in an
offering memorandum.
172. Because Exchange Act companies already have audited financial statements, the issuers most affected by this requirement will be investment companies and unworthy issuers
that are excluded from using Rule 505. 47 Fed. Reg. 11,251, 11,266 (1982) (to be codified at
17 C.F.R. §§ 239.505(a), (b)(2)(iii)). The auditing requirements do not create an excessive
hardship for non-Exchange Act companies using Rule 506 because the cost is spread over
the larger dollar amount of the offering.
173. Id. at 11,264-65 (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(b)(2)(i)(B)).
174. Id. at 11,266 (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.505(b)(2)(ii), .506(b)(2)(i)). Presumably, an issuer reasonably believing that a sale is to only 35 purchasers does not forfeit the
exemption automatically if that number is exceeded.
175. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.146(g), .242(e) (1981).
176. 47 Fed. Reg. 11,251, 11,263 (1982) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(e)). Because
the 35-purchaser limitation does not apply to offerings under Rule 504, state laws determine
the limits of distribution for Rule 504 offerings. No offering under Reg. D, however, may be
offered so widely that it violates the prohibition against public offerings required in Rule
502, id. at 11,265 (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(c)), unless made exclusively in states
that require the filing of a registration statement and the delivery of a prospectus. Id. at
11,266 (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 230.504(b)). The filing of such information with the

1982]

149

REGULATION D

issuers having more than one hundred beneficial
which excluded
7
owners.

17

Reg. D excludes accredited investors from the thirty-five purchaser limit, 7 8 thereby increasing the potential number of actual

purchasers relative to former Rules 242 and 146. Rule 242 excluded
"accredited persons" from the thirty-five purchaser limit, which is
a narrower concept than "accredited investor.

' 17 9

Rule 146 ex-

cluded $150 thousand purchasers, which also is a narrower concept
than "accredited investors."' 80 Each of the rules excludes persons
closely identifiable with other purchasers, such as spouses and controlled organizations.18 ' Prior rules, however, excluded organizations controlled by purchasers from the thirty-five purchaser limit
only if the purchaser owned one hundred percent of the organization's equity.' 82 Reg. D excludes controlled organizations from the
number of purchasers when a purchaser's interest exceeds fifty
percent. 8 3 This modification further increases the potential number of actual purchasers for an offering under Reg. D. 1 " Excluding
certain actual purchasers from the calculation of the purchaser
limit does not discharge the issuer's duty to meet other requirements of Reg. D with respect to these purchasers. 85
state is sufficient protection. Id.
177. 17 C.F.R. § 230.240(f) (1981).
178. 47 Fed. Reg. 11,251, 11,263 (1982) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(e)(1)(iv)).
179. 17 C.F.R. § 230.242(a)(1) (1981).
180. 17 C.F.R. § 230.146(g)(2)(d) (1981).
181. 47 Fed. Reg. 11,251, 11,263 (1982) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(e)); 17
C.F.R. §§ 230.146(a)(1), .240(f), 242(e)(2) (1981).
182. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.146(a)(1), .240(f), .242(e)(2) (1981).
183. 47 Fed. Reg. 11,251, 11,263 (1982) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(e)(1)(ii)).
For a discussion of the uncertainties involving accredited investors and purchasers, see infra
note 275 and accompanying text.
184. Clients of a broker-dealer must be counted separately. 47 Fed. Reg. 11,251, 11,263
(1982) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(e)(2)). All members of an organization formed
solely to invest in a limited offering also must be counted, unless all of the owners are accredited. Id.
185. Id. In an offering not made exclusively to accredited investors, for instance, even if
an investor does not count toward the 35-purchaser limit, the issuer still must provide all
investors with the required information. Id. at 11,264 (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. §
230.502(b)(1)(ii)). The issuer also must inform all purchasers of resale restrictions on the
securities. Id. at 11,265 (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(d)).
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Integration and Aggregation
Integration and aggregation are related but distinct principles
that may disqualify an offering of securities from an exemption
under Reg. D. 18 6 Integration allows combination of separate sales
of securities into one offering when the securities have sufficiently
similar characteristics.1 7 Aggregation automatically combines the
dollar amounts of certain offerings, limiting the amount of securities that an issuer may sell under a particular exemption.1 8 8
An issuer of an exempt offering faces two dangers from integration. One exemption may be lost through integration of sales that
were intended to qualify under an incompatible exemption.8 9 Additionally, integration may cause an offering to exceed the exemption's dollar limitation.19 0 Under traditional criteria for integration, 91 the issuer wanting to make an exempt offering could not be
186. The SEC stated:
Based on its experience with rule 242, the Commission is aware that in computing the aggregate offering price issuers frequently misunderstand the interaction of the concepts of aggregation and integration as applicable under rules
504(b)(2)(i) and 505 (b)(2)(i). Aggregation is the principle by which an issuer
determines the dollar worth of exempt sales available directly under section
3(b) of the Securities Act. Integration is a principle under which an issuer determines overall characteristics of its offerings.
47 Fed. Reg. 11,251, 11,258 n.31.
187. Id.
188. Id. The aggregation rules prevent an issuer from exceeding the $5 million ceiling of
Rule 505 by combining § 3(b) exemptions. 47 Fed. Reg. 11,251, 11,266 (to be codified at 17
C.F.R. § 230.505(b)(2)(i)). Although Reg. D requires no specific disclosures for intrastate
offerings and large offerings made solely to accredited investors, Rules 504 and 505 do not
require aggregation of these offerings because these offerings are not § 3(b) exemptions. Id.
189. For example, an issuer may not exempt part of an issue as an intrastate offering and
part of the same issue as a nonpublic offering. See I L. Loss, SEcuRmEs REGULATION, 591-96
(1961).
190. For example, if an issuer integrates two sequential offerings of $3 million pursuant to
Rule 505, both offerings lose the exemption because they exceed the $5 million limit. For
this reason, Reg. D has a uniform safe harbor of six months. 47 Fed. Reg. 11,251, 11,264
(1982) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(a)).
191. Traditionally, the following five factors helped to determine whether separate sales
of securities were part of a single issue:
a) whether the sales are part of a single plan of financing;
b) whether the sales involve issuance of the same class of securities;
c) whether the sales have been made at or about the same time;
d) whether the same type of consideration is received; and
e) whether the sales are made for the same general purpose.
27 Fed. Reg. 11,316-17 (1962), reprinted in 47 Fed. Reg. 11,251, 11,264 (1982).
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certain that a prior offering had come to rest.19 2 Reg. D provides a
safe harbor from integration for any offers or sales of securities
more than six months before or after a given offering. 19 3 Rules 146
and 242 contained comparable safe harbor provisions, but Rule 240
did not contain the provision.19 4 Thus, an issuer may make an exempt offering under Rule 504 with greater certainty than under
Rule 240.
Aggregation involves different rules. In calculating the dollar
amount of an offering under Rules 504 and 505, the issuer must
include all sales during the preceding twelve months under section
3(b) 195 or in violation of section 5.196 Rule 240 contained more restrictive aggregation rules, requiring aggregation of all securities
sold without registration. 197 Rule 240, however, excluded from aggregation sales made to promoters, directors, officers and full-time
employees of the issuer. 1e8 Rule 504 does not exclude from aggregation sales to these persons because of the significant increase in the
offering ceiling.19 9
192. Because subsequent resales by purchasers from the issuer could be interpreted as
part of the original distribution, under the traditional rules an issue could continue far beyond the final transaction in which the issuer was a party. The safe harbor under Rule 502
reduces this uncertainty by terminating an issue for integration purposes at the date of last
sale or offer "by or for the issuer." 47 Fed. Reg. 11,251, 11,264 (1982) (to be codified at 17
C.F.R. § 230.502(a)).
193. Id.
194. 17 C.F.R. § 230.146(b)(1) (1981), 17 C.F.R. § 230.242(b) (1981); 17 C.F.R. § 230.240
(1981).
195. Section 3(b) of the Securities Act authorizes the SEC to create limited offering exemptions for issues of securities within its $5 million ceiling. Securities Act of 1933, § 3(b),
15 U.S.C. § 77c(b) (Supp. IV 1980). Reg. A, Rule 504, and Rule 505 are the current § 3(b)
exemptions, although offerings made under Rules 240 and 242 may require aggregation until
June 30, 1983 (twelve months after the rescission of those rules).
196. Section 5 requires registration of nonexempt securities. Securities Act of 1933, § 5, 15
U.S.C. § 77e (1976). Consequently, an issuer of unregistered securities under Rules 504 and
505 need not aggregate sales made under an exemption other than § 3(b). 47 Fed. Reg.
11,251, 11,266 (1982) (to be codified at 47 C.F.R. §§ 230.504(b)(1), .505(b)(2)).
In proposed form, Reg. D also aggregated certain sales made by predecessors or affiliates
of the issuer as defined in proposed Rule 501(j). 46 Fed. Reg. 41,791, 41,804 (1981). The
SEC deleted these definitions from the final regulation. Reg. D does not require aggregation
of these sales. The sales by predecessors and affiliates may be integrated,however, and the
closeness of the affiliate's relationship with the issuer is a factor for consideration. 47 Fed.
Reg. 11,251, 11,253 (1982).
197. 17 C.F.R. § 230.240(e) (1981).
198. Id. n.(3)(b)(ii).
199. 46 Fed. Reg. 41,791, 41,800 (1981). The SEC's inclusion of sales to insiders in the

152.
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The aggregation rules for Rule 242 were slightly less restrictive
than those for Reg. D. Rule 242 did not aggregate sales under section 3(b) to certain employee benefit plans or sales in violation of
section 5.200 In addition, Rule 242 only aggregated sales during the
preceding six months, consistent with its offering ceiling of $2 million every six months. 201 Rule 505 aggregates over a twelve month
period, having raised the offering ceiling to $5 million a year. 2
Limitation on Manner of Offering
Consistent with former Rules 240, 242, and 146, Reg. D prohibits
an issuer from offering securities by general solicitation or public
advertising. 20 3 Neither the issuer nor his selling agent may advertise the securities publicly or offer the securities at any seminar to
which the attendees are invited through the public media.2 0 ' The
manner of offering limitations in Reg. D are simpler than under
Rule 146 because the issuer has no duty to evaluate the qualifications of offerees prior to the offer.20 5 Reg. D permits the issuer to
offer the securities to anyone provided that the issuer observes the
total issue amount for Rule 504 is inconsistent with its policies of capital formation and
investor protection. First, such inclusion effectively limits the stated increase in the exemption ceiling relative to Rule 240. Second, when insiders participate in an offering with outsiders, the outsiders' investment has more safety, not less. Third, insiders are accredited
investors who do not need the disclosure protection of the Act. Fourth, insiders probably are

state residents and particularly subject to state control. Arguably, therefore, sales to insiders
should not reduce the amount of outside financing available to an issuer under Rule 504.
200. 47 Fed. Reg. 11,251, 11,258 n.32 (1982).

201. 17 C.F.R. § 230.242(c) (1981).
202. 47 Fed. Reg. 11,251, 11,266 (1982) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 230.505(b)(2)).
203. Rule 502(c) states:
Except as provided in § 230.504(b)(1), neither the issuer nor any person acting

on its behalf shall offer or sell the securities by any form of general solicitation
or general advertising, including, but not limited to, the following:
(1) Any advertisement, article, notice or other communication published in

any newspaper, magazine, or similar media or broadcast over television or radio; and
(2) Any seminar or meeting whose attendees have been invited by any general solicitation or general advertising.
Id. at 11,265 (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(c)).

204. Issuers would benefit, however, if the SEC issued some objective guidelines defining
general solicitation. Until such time, issuers ihould request interpretive letters from the
SEC. 47 Fed. Reg. 11,251, 11,261 (1982).

205. For a discussion of the issuer's duty under Rule 146, see supra notes 39 & 40 and
accompanying text.
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limitations on the number and qualifications of ultimate purchasers and does not solicit in a public manner. " °'
Limitations on Resale
Only the issuer is exempt from registering the securities under
Reg. D; subsequent transfer of the securities by purchasers is unlawful absent registration or another available exemption.20 This
restriction applies even to resales between accredited investors.2 8
The issuer must take the following steps to insure that purchasers observe restrictions on resale:
1) make a reasonable inquiry to determine that the purchaser
acquires the securities for himself or on behalf of another;
2) make written disclosure to each purchaser that the securities
are unregistered and may not be resold without registration or
exemption; and
3) place an appropriate legend on each stock certificate.2 09
These provisions mirror those of Rules 240 and 242.210 Rule 146
further required that the issuer place stop-transfer instructions
with the stock transfer agent to ensure the observation of the resale restriction.211 Although the SEC still advises using stop-transfer instructions, they are not required for an offering exempt under
Reg. D.212
206. The limitations on manner of offering under Rule 504 are waived, however, for offer-

ings made exclusively in states that require the filing of a registration statement and the
delivery of a prospectus. 47 Fed. Reg. 11,251, 11,266 (1982) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. §
230.504(b)(1)).
207. Rule 144 provides an exemption for resale of restricted securities if the resale is not a
distribution. Three criteria for determining whether the resale constitutes a distribution are
the existence of adequate current public information about the issuer, the original purchaser's holding period, and the impact of the transaction on the trading market. 17 C.F.R.
§ 230.144 prelim. note (1981). A purchaser reselling without registration or compliance with
an exemption may be an underwriter as defined in § 2(11) and subject to strict liability
under § 12(1). Securities Act of 1933, §§ 2(11), 12(1), 15 U.S.C. §§ 77b(11), 771(1) (1976).
208. Because accredited investors can fend for themselves, less reason exists to restrict
securities for resale to accredited investors than to nonaccredited investors. For a discussion
of policy regarding resales to accredited investors, see infra notes 276-79 and accompanying
text.

209.
210.
211.
212.

47
17
17
46

Fed. Reg. 11,251, 11,265 (1982) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(d)).
C.F.R. §§ 230.240(g)(1)-(3), .242(g)(1)-(3) (1981).
C.F.R. § 230.146(h)(3) (1981).
Fed. Reg. 41,791, 41,799 (1981).
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Filing Form D
To qualify for the exemptions, Reg. D requires the issuer to file a
notice of sales form, Form D, with the SEC within fifteen days after the first sale of securities.2 1 The issuer then must file Form D
every six months during the course of the offering and within
thirty days after the completion of the offering. 214 Additionally, the
issuer must provide the SEC, on request, with copies of any information furnished to nonaccredited investors under Rule 505.215
Issuers use Form D to report offerings made pursuant to Reg. D
and section 4(6).21" The new form replaces Forms 240, 242, 146,
and 4(6).217 Form D is similar to Form 242, with the additional
requirement that the issuer disclose the states in which securities
are offered. 218 All forms require the issuer to answer specific questions about the exempt offering.2 19 Form D, however, requires more
information than did Form 146,220 and filing Form D is a condition
precedent to an exemption, unlike Form 240.221 Thus, Reg. D increases an issuer's filing burden for very large and very small offerings. The SEC plans to modify Form D after monitoring Reg. D's
effectiveness as a capital forming device.2 22
SUMMARY AND OBSERVATIONS

The goal of Reg. D is to lower the cost of equity financing for
small businesses in a manner consistent with investor protection.
The cost of equity financing will decrease because a broader class
of issuers may make exempt offerings in increased dollar amounts

213. 47 Fed. Reg. 11,251, 11,265 (1982) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 230.503(a)(1)).
214. Id. (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. 2 230.503(a)(2), (3)).
215. Id. (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 230.503(d)).
216. Id. at 11,267 (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 239.500).
217. Previously, Rules 240, 242, and 146 and § 4(6) each had separate forms. Form 146
was due at the time of first sale, 17 C.F.R. § 239.146 (1981), Forms 242 and 4(6) were due no
later than 10 days after first sale, id. §§ 239.242, .246, and Form 240 was due no more than
10 days after the close of the first month in which a sale was made, id. 239.240.
218. The purpose of this requirement is to check the effectiveness of efforts to promote
federal and state coordination of filing exemptions. 46 Fed. Reg. 41,791, 41,799 (1981).
219. 17 C.F.R. §§ 239.146, .240, .242, .246 (1981); 47 Fed. Reg. 11,251, 11,267 (1982) (to be
codified at 17 C.F.R. § 239.500).
220. 17 C.F.R. § 239.146 (1981).
221. 17 C.F.R. § 230.240(h)(2) (1981).
222. 46 Fed. Reg. 41,791, 41,800 (1981).
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and with reduced disclosure obligations to a broader class of investors. The SEC accomplished this result by extending the concept
of accredited investors22 and by raising the ceilings on limited offering exemptions.224 These actions are consistent with investor
protection because the SEC has not reduced the issuer's disclosure
obligation to nonaccredited investors.22 5 In fact, if nonaccredited
investors participate in an offering under Rule 506, the disclosure
burden actually exceeds that of former Rule 146.226 Thus, increased disclosure burdens may force issuers to exclude nonaccredited investors from large offerings under Rule 506.227
The consolidation of terms and conditions into one regulation
has many salutory effects. Unlike prior rules, 28 Reg. D is internally
consistent, which simplifies the federal exemption framework. The
new regulation also increases an issuer's certainty that exemption
qualifications have been met. Moreover, consistency and certainty
should assist courts in interpreting securities regulations and exemptions. Despite its many advances, however, Reg. D creates or
leaves unresolved several problems.
Problems of Statutory Authority
The SEC's statutory authority for extending the accredited inVestor concept to offerings in excess of $5 million is unclear. The
223. See supra notes 72-114 and accompanying text.
224. See supra notes 115, 116, 136 & 157 and accompanying text.
225. Rules 504, 505, and 506 generally require the same disclosure as Rules 240, 242 and
146. The requirements for preparing audited financial statements in Reg. D, however, are
slightly more restrictive than Rule 146 and slightly less restrictive than Rule 242. 47 Fed.
Reg. 11,251, 11,264-65 (1982) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(b)); 17 C.F.R. §
230.240(b), .242(f) (1981).
226. Like Rule 146, Rule 506 requires the issuer to disclose to nonaccredited investors the
same information required in a registration statement. 17 C.F.R. § 230.146(e)(1) (1981); 47
Fed. Reg. 11,251, 11,264-65 (1982) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(b)(2)(B)). Unlike
Rule 146, however, Rule 506 requires that at least the issuer's balance sheet be audited. 47
Fed. Reg. 11,251, 11,264-65 (1982) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(b)(2)(B)).
227. Sales to any nonaccredited investors obligate the issuer to provide disclosure documents to every investor. 47 Fed. Reg. 11,251, 11,264 (1982) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. §
230.502(b)(1)(ii)). In addition, the issuer must catalog and disclose any information provided to accredited investors to nonaccredited investors participating in the same offering.
Id. at 11,265 (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(b)(2)(iv)). To avoid this increased cost in
a large offering, issuers must exclude nonaccredited investors.
228. 17 C.F.R. §§ 239.146, .240, .242 (1981).
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SEC promulgated Rule 506 pursuant to the SEC's power to define
"nonpublic offering" under section 4(2).229 By extending the accredited investor concept to Rule 506, however, the SEC authorizes
issuers to sell large amounts of unregistered securities without requiring specific disclosure to investors who may lack access to information.23 0 This results in a definition of "nonpublic offering"
that is inconsistent with case law interpreting section 4(2).231
Assuming that section 4(2) does not authorize the SEC to extend
the accredited investor concept to Rule 506, the validity of the
SEC's action must rest on another statutory provision. Section
2(15) authorizes the SEC to expand the definition of accredited
investors.2 3 2 Prior to Reg. D, however, only section 4(6) contained
the term "accredited investor," and that section had a $5 million
ceiling.2 3 The SEC's own rulemaking authority also has a $5 mil234 Arguably, unless section 19(c) 2 3 5
lion limit under section 3(b).
gives the SEC the power to extend the accredited investor concept
to offerings exceeding $5 million, the SEC acted without authority.
Issuers making large offerings under Rule 506 to accredited investors without making disclosures similar to a full registration statement, therefore, may risk judicial denial of the registration
exemption.23 6
Problems of an Unsafe Harbor
Reg. D states that an offering not in compliance with Reg. D

229. 47 Fed. Reg. 11,251, 11,266 (1982) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 230.506(a)).
230. For a discussion of accredited investors' access to information, see supra notes 96111 and accompanying text.
231. For a discussion of judicial precedents interpreting § 4(2), see supra note 28 and
accompanying text.
232. Securities Act of 1933, § 2(15), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(15) (Supp. IV 1980). See supra note
55.
233. Id. § 4(6), 15 U.S.C. § 77d(6) (Supp. IV 1980). See supra note 56.
234. Id. § 3(b), 15 U.S.C. § 77c(b) (Supp. IV 1980).
235. Securities Act of 1933, § 19(c), 15 U.S.C. § 77s(c) (Supp. IV 1980)) (quoted supra
note 58). Section 19(c) requires cooperation between federal and state agencies to develop a

national system of securities regulation. Id.
236. Alternatively, courts may use Rule 506 as they did Rule 146 to interpret § 4(2). See

supra note 39. Using Rule 506 instead of Rule 146 to interpret § 4(2), however, is less consistent with case law. Rule 506 neither requires the issuer to evaluate offeree qualifications
nor ensures that every purchaser has access to information or receives specific disclosures.

For a discussion of case precedents, see supra note 28 and accompanying text.
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provisions may nevertheless qualify under another exemption;..
however, this may be a false promise. Rule 506238 permits sales to
accredited investors without specific disclosures 2 3 ' and eliminates
the issuer's duty to determine the qualifications of offerees. 40 Current case law under section 4(2), however, requires an issuer to
make specific disclosures to every offeree not having independent
access to information, and to evaluate the wealth or sophistication
of every potential offeree.2 41 Thus, an issuer ignoring offeree qualifications or relying on the accredited investor concept may sacrifice
his ability to rely on section 4(2).'
Reg. A is the only alternative section 3(b) exemption generally
available for offerings failing to satisfy Rules 504 and 505.243 Reg.
A, however, has a ceiling of $1.5 million.2 " Sales below that
amount will not be exempted because the offering did not satisfy
the Reg. A disclosure requirements by filing with the SEC.24 Thus,
offerings that fail to comply with Rules 504 and 505 may not have
a residual exemption under section 3(b).
Section 4(6),246 enacted by Congress in 1980, should serve as a
residual exemption for offerings up to $5 million made solely to
accredited investors. The SEC may have intended that result because section 4(6) and Reg. D use the same definition of accredited

237. See supra note 62.
238. Rule 506(a) provides that: "Offers and sales of securities by an issuer that satisfy the
conditions in paragraph (b) of this section shall be deemed to be transactions not involving
any public offering within the meaning of section 4(2) of the Act." 47 Fed. Reg. 11,251,
11,266 (1982) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 230.506(a)).
239. 47 Fed. Reg. 11,251, 11,264 (1982) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(b)(1)(i)).
240. 47 Fed. Reg. 11,251, 11,258 (1982).
241. For a discussion of the disclosure requirements under § 4(2), see supra note 28 and
accompanying text.
242. See supra note 236.

243. 17 C.F.R. § 230.251-.264 (1981). Rules 240 and 242 also were § 3(b) exemptions, 17
C.F.R. §§ 230.240(b), .242(b) (1981), but were rescinded effective June 30, 1982, 47 Fed. Reg.
11,251, 11,261 (1982).

244. 17 C.F.R. § 230.254(a) (1981).
245. 17 C.F.R. 9 230.251-.264 (1981). Although technically an exemption promulgated
under § 3(b), Reg. A provides a short form registration statement, Form 1-A, which must
accompany all offerings under Reg. A. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.255, .256 (1981). Form 1-A is similar
to Form .S-18. 47 Fed. Reg. 41,791, 41,794 (1981).
246. Securities Act of 1933, §4(6), 15 U.S.C. § 77d(6) (Supp. IV 1980).

[Vol. 24:121

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

investors247 and the same notice of sales form.24 8 Section 4(6), however, does not cover sales to nonaccredited investors or sales in excess of $5 million.249 If an issuer under Reg. D sells more than $5
million or sells to nonaccredited investors, he must comply completely with Rules 501 through 506 or rely solely on the narrow
intrastate offering exemption of section 3(a)(11)

2 50

and Rule 147.251

Because an issuer loses the Reg. D exemption for even an inadvertent failure to comply with any of its terms, the lack of a residual
exemption could be very risky for the issuer.252
Problems Related to Accredited Investors
Reg. D does not specify exactly what information an issuer must
disclose in an offering sold only to accredited investors. The SEC
could aid issuers by describing the standard of proof required to
defend successfully against suit by an accredited investor claiming
inadequate disclosure.25 If issuers must prove that they made disclosures comparable to a registration statement to every accredited
investor, the only value of the expanded concept in Reg. D is to
increase the number of potential purchasers under Rules 505 and
506.254 Because Reg. D does not provide an exemption from the
civil liability and anti-fraud provisions of the Act, issuers otherwise
exempt from specific federal disclosure obligations under Rules 504
247. 47 Fed. Reg. 11,251, 11,253 n.11 (1982).
248. 47 Fed. Reg. 11,251, 11,267 (1982) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 239.500).
249. Securities Act of 1933, § 4(6), 15 U.S.C. § 77d(6) (Supp. IV 1980).
250. Securities Act of 1933, § 3(a)(11), 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(11) (1976).
251. 17 C.F.R. § 230.147 (1981). To qualify for the registration exemption under Rule 147,
the issuer must be incorporated in that state, the issuer's primary business location must be
in that state, all purchasers must be state residents, and nearly all proceeds must be used in
the state. Id. Unless Reg. D offerings intentionally are limited to one state, the utility of
Rule 147 as a residual exemption is doubtful.
252. Rules 504-506 provide that exempt offerings must satisfy all the conditions of Rules
501-503. 47 Fed. Reg. 11,251, -11,266 (1982) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.504(b)(1),
.505(b)(1), and .506(b)(1)).
253. If an investor alleges inadequate disclosure in the purchase or sale of a security, the
issuer has the burden of showing that he fulfilled the required disclosures. See, e.g., Lively
v. Hirschfeld, 440 F.2d 631 (10th Cir. 1971).
254. Because Rules 505 and 506 exclude accredited investors from the 35-purchaser limitation, the expanded use of the accredited investor concept increases the potential distribution of offerings under these rules. 47 Fed. Reg. 11,251, 11,263 (1982) (to be codified at 17
C.F.R. § 230.501(e)(1)(iv)). Rule 506 also exempts the issuer from having to consider an
offeree's sophistication. Id. at 11,266 (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 230.506(b)(2)(ii)).
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through 506 may be subject to substantial disclosure obligations
under sections 12 and 17 of the Securities Act of 1933,255 or under
Rule lOb-5 256 promulgated under section 10b of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.257 Until the SEC clarifies issuers' disclosure
obligations to accredited investors, a prudent issuer will provide all
investors with a detailed offering memorandum to reduce the issuer's potential liability and to avail itself of the residual exemption of section 4(2).58
Reg. D contains other ambiguities concerning the concept of accredited investors, particularly the categories of natural persons.25 9
The proposed regulation defined an individual's "income" as adjusted gross income reported on a federal personal income tax return. 60 The final regulation does not define "income" and does not
provide clear measurement guidelines for determining an individual's wealth. 6 1 The SEC rejected the concept of self-certification,
in which an investor certifies to the SEC as to his or her own net
worth, sophistication, and financial experience, as being inconsis255. Securities Act of 1933, §§ 12, 17, 15 U.S.C. §§ 771, q (1976).
256. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1981). Rule 10b-5 provides that:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any
facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of
the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security.
Id.
257. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976).
258. See supra notes 237-42 and accompanying text.
259. 47 Fed. Reg. 11,251, 11,263 (1982) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. 230.501(a)(5)-(7)).
260. 46 Fed. Reg. 41,791, 41,803 (1981).
261. 47 Fed. Reg. 11,251, 11,255 (1982). The SEC suggests that income may be determined by computing
individual adjusted gross income (assuming that had been reported on a federal tax return) increased by any deduction for long term capital gain under
section 1202 of the Internal Revenue Code (the "Code"), any deduction for
depletion under section 611 et seq. of the Code, any exclusion for interest
under section 103 of the Code, and any losses of a partnership allocated to the
individual limited partner as reported on Schedule E of Form 1040 (or any
successor report).
Id. The SEC has offered no other guidance in the matter.
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tent with investor protection." 2 Unfortunately, the SEC did not
indicate the method of wealth determination that would be acceptable. Additionally, without clear guidelines, wealthy foreign investors who do not file federal income tax returns and wealthy Americans who shelter a substantial amount of their taxable income may
have difficulty demonstrating their accredited investor status. 63
The use of income and wealth criteria to define natural persons
as accredited investors undermines the rationale for making natural persons $150 thousand purchasers. A natural person qualifies as
an accredited investor based on wealth if he has a net worth of $1
million, or if he has a net worth of $750 thousand and is willing to
invest $150 thousand. 6 4 Thus, millionaires may invest as much or
as little as they wish in an exempt offering, thereby providing them
with a less risky investment, and giving issuers a valuable source
for capital formation. Persons with assets of $750 thousand, however, must invest twenty percent of their wealth.2 6 5 An understandable reluctance on the part of the latter group of investors to risk
so significant a portion of their wealth probably will render this
category meaningless.
Realistically, the $150 thousand purchaser category serves only
to define a method by which private companies may be accredited,2 6 thereby highlighting Reg. D's unequal treatment of large
organizations. Reg. D includes nonprofit institutions that have
more than $5 million in assets as accredited investors.6 7 Private

262. 46 Fed. Reg. 41,791, 41,795 n.15 (1981).
263. 47 Fed. Reg. 11,251, 11,255 (1982).
264. 47 Fed. Reg. 11,251, 11,263 (1982) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a)(5)-(6)).
An investor's net worth must exceed $750 thousand for $150 thousand to represent less than
20% of his assets. 47 Fed. Reg. 11,251, 11,255 (1982).
265. Rule 501(a)(5) requires natural persons who are not millionaires to invest 15-20% of
their net worth in an exempt offering to be accredited as $150 thousand purchasers. 47 Fed.
Reg. 11,251, 11,255 (1982). This requirement will discourage persons with assets of $750
thousand from participating in an offering limited to accredited investors, although presumably they are not significantly less able than millionaires to protect themselves.
266. Financial institutions, business development companies, large nonprofit organizations, and natural persons are accredited without a minimum purchase requirement. Id. at
11,262-63 (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a)(1)-(4), (6)-(8)). Because they are excluded
from the income and wealth tests, other kinds of private companies are accredited only if

they purchase at least $150 thousand and are worth at least five times their investment. Id.
at 11,263 (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a)(3)).
267. Id. at 11,262 (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a)(3)).
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businesses are not accredited, however, unless they are wholly
' or are willing to purchase $150
owned by accredited investors 68
thousand in unregistered securities.2

69

If private corporations could

qualify as accredited investors based on their income and wealth,
270
the $150 thousand purchaser category would be unnecessary.
Other Problems
Reg. D creates uncertainty in its rules for counting the number
of purchasers, 7 1 and in its manner of offering limitations.2 2 One
question Reg. D does not answer is whether the spouse, close relatives, and controlled organizations of an accredited investor are included in determining the number of purchasers. 7 3 Furthermore,
although thirty-five nonaccredited investors are allowed to participate in the sale,274 Reg. D leaves unanswered how many offerees an
issuer may contact without violating the prohibition against general solicitation and advertising.2 7- 5 This uncertainty forces an is268. Id. at 11,263 (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a)(8)).
269. Id. (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a)(5)).
270. The $150 thousand test was a standard of access to information adopted from Rule
242. 47 Fed. Reg. 11,251, 11,254 (1982). The SEC abandoned the strict access requirement,
however, in defining the new categories of accredited investors based on wealth. For a discussion of the access provisions under Reg. D, see supra notes 90-111 and accompanying
text. Because natural persons and other institutions must meet less restrictive standards to
be considered accredited, the SEC could abandon the $150 thousand purchaser category if
private businesses of sufficient income and wealth were defined as accredited investors.
271. Id. at 11,251, 11,263 (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(e)).
272. Id. at 11,265 (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(c)).
273. Rules 505 and 506 exclude accredited investors from the 35-purchaser limitation. 47
Fed. Reg. 11,251, 11,263 (1982) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(e)(1)). Yet Rule 502
includes accredited investors as purchasers for disclosure requirements. Id. at 11,264 (to be
codified at 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(b)(1)(ii)). Because Rule 501(e) also excludes parties closely
related to purchasers from counting in the 35-purchaser limitation, id. at 11,263 (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(e)(1)(i)(ii)), an issuer cannot be certain whether parties closely
related to accredited investors may bie excluded. This uncertainty is a potential trap for
issuers seeking to comply with the 35-purchaser limit.
Organizations must be wholly owned by accredited investors, however, to be themselves
accredited. Id. at 11,263 (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a)(8)). Therefore, an issuer
that sells securities to an organization controlled by accredited investors who do not own
100% of the equity in the organization, assumes specific disclosure obligations to every participant in the offering. Id. at 11,264 (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(b)(1)(ii)).
274. Id. at 11,266 (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 230.505(b)(2)(ii)).
275. The SEC notes that:
pursuant to the accredited investor concept in Regulation D, offerings could
theoretically be made to an unlimited number of accredited investors. The
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suer to choose between limiting the offering or risking loss of the
exemption.
The SEC also must address certain issues regarding Reg. D's
limitations on resale. An accredited investor cannot resell restricted securities to other accredited investors without registration
or qualifying for an exemption. 7 6 Presumably, however, accredited
investors are no less able to protect themselves after a security is
issued than before, and a resale limitation unnecessarily restricts a
valuable secondary market for the stock.2 77 To increase the marketability of exempt offerings, the SEC should adopt a provision
similar to that in S-18 and allow a certain fraction of the27 offering
amount to be reserved for resale to accredited investors.
A different resale problem involves uncertificated securities. Because Reg. D eliminates the issuer's duty to issue stop-transfer instructions and now requires labelling on the share certificate, nothing gives notice of the stock's restricted status to the subsequent
purchaser of an uncertificated security.27 9 The SEC should require
stop-transfer instructions if uncertificated securities are involved.
The SEC should explain why only Rule 505 excludes unworthy
issuers.2 s° Such issuers pose a greater danger to investors under
Rule 504 which requires no disclosure, and under Rule 506 which
has no offering ceiling. For consistency and investor protection, the
SEC should require an unworthy issuer to obtain specific approval
from the SEC before using any Reg. D exemption.
Another inconsistency is the Reg. D requirement that an issuer

Commission cautions issuers, however, that depending on the actual circumstances, offerings made to such large numbers of purchasers may involve a violation of the prohibitions against general solicitation and general advertising.
46 Fed. Reg. 41,791, 41,799 n.30 (1981).
276. Id. at 11,265 (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(d)).
277. In some cases, however, accredited investors may not be able to protect themselves
as well in a secondary purchase because they do not have direct access to the issuer. The
new categories of accredited investors, however, do not require such access to the issuer in
an initial transaction. For a discussion of access under Reg. D, see supra note 110 and accompanying text.
278. Form S-18 allows issuers to reserve $1.5 million of the $5 million ceiling for resale
without full registration or compliance with an exemption. 17 C.F.R. § 239.28(d) (1981).
279. 46 Fed. Reg. 41,791, 41,799 (1981).
280. 47 Fed. Reg. 11,251, 11,266 (1982) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 230.505(b)(2)(iii)).
Rule 505(b)(2)(iii), however, provides that an unworthy issuer may be permitted to use the

Rule 505 exemption upon a showing of good cause. Id.
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evaluate purchaser sophistication only under Rule 506. Because
Rule 506 requires more disclosure than Rules 504 and 505, purchasers of offerings under the latter rules need greater sophistication.2 81 The only apparent incentive for an Exchange Act issuer to
make an offering pursuant to Rule 505 is to avoid the duty to evaluate the qualifications of purchasers; 282 this motive does not serve
Reg. D's purposes.
The new requirements for audited financial statements under
Rules 505 and 506 could work an undue hardship on certain small
issuers because those rules do not allow a complete waiver of auditing when expense is unreasonable. Requiring issuers to bear
greater costs in preparing financial reports under Rules 505 and
506 than previously under Reg. A and Rule 146 is contrary to the
SEC's overall objectives in promulgating Reg. D.253
Finally, the SEC should decide whether to apply federal restrictions on the manner of offering and resale in states that do not
require the delivery of a prospectus. 28 4 Such a requirement is in281. Purchasers in Rule 504 and Rule 505 offerings need more financial sophistication
because less comparability exists among the financial -reports of non-Exchange Act companies which do not have to file reports in a federal format. In addition, investments in small
businesses are riskier than investments in large companies. For a discussion of risk, see
supra note 101.
In the proposed Rule 502, the SEC considered additional investor protection by requiring
that all commissions be paid to registered broker-dealers. The SEC eliminated this requirement because it was inconsistent with state laws regulating the payment of commissions. 47
Fed. Reg. 11,251, 11,256 (1982). Indirectly, however, by imposing a purchaser sophistication
test, the SEC encourages issuers of large offerings to sell through brokerage houses which
would qualify as purchaser representatives. 47 Fed. Reg. 11,251, 11,266 (1982) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 230.506(b)(2)(ii)). This provides additional protection for investors of
large offerings "since a registered broker-dealer, pursuant to its suitability obligations, must
make a determination as to whether participation in the offering is appropriate for each
investor." 46 Fed. Reg. 41,791, 41,799 (1981).
282. Except for the purchaser qualification test, Exchange Act companies must meet an
identical disclosure burden under Rules 505 and 506. 47 Fed. Reg. 11,251, 11,264-65 (1982)
(to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(b)(2)(ii)). The SEC promulgated Rule 505 under §
3(b) and Rule 506 under § 4(2). Id. at 11,266 (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.505(a),
.506(a)). Exchange Act issuers, however, would make offerings under Rule 505 to avoid the
restrictive judicial interpretations of § 4(2) as a residual exemption. For a discussion of judicial interpretations of § 4(2) see supra notes 28 & 39 and accompanying text.
283. The SEC intends that Reg. D will decrease the burden on small issuers consistent
with investor protection. 47 Fed. Reg. 11,251, 11,252 (1982). Increasing the reporting requirements for exemptions without allowance for hardship increases offering costs, and may
preclude issuers from selling to nonaccredited investors.
284. 47 Fed. Reg. 11,251, 11,266 (1982) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 230.504(b)(1)).
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consistent with the belief that federal regulation is inappropriate
for offerings below $500 thousand. For Reg. D to benefit small issuers most effectively, federal and state exemptions must coincide.28 5
If state statutes are more restrictive, Reg. D will have little effect. 2 6 Similarly, if federal regulations unnecessarily intrude on

state systems, the federal regulations negate the benefit of the
state exemptions. Moreover, imposing the federal restrictions on

offerings otherwise exempt under Rule 504 constitutes a trap for
the unwary issuer who expects to rely on the provisions of his
28 7
state's securities laws.
CONCLUSION

Reg. D generally should accomplish the SEC's objectives of simplifying the federal exemption framework and encouraging capital
formation in the small business sector.2 8s Whether Reg. D becomes
285. An offering under Rule 504 must comply with the provisions of Rules 501-503, except that such an offering is exempt from the disclosure requirements of Rule 502. Id. at
11,264 (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(b)(1)(i)). If the states in which the securities
are offered require no registration of the offering or delivery of a prospectus, the federal
restrictions on manner of offering and resale still apply. Id. at 11,266 (to be codified at 17
C.F.R. § 230.504(b)(1)). This conflicts with the terms of the intrastate offering exemption
which has no offering or resale limitations. 17 C.F.R. § 230.147 (1981). Each state can protect its own investors in small offerings without requiring issuers to comply piecemeal with
federal requirments. Requiring the SEC to police small offerings that are otherwise exempt
from federal disclosure requirements is inefficient and potentially misleading to small
issuers.
286. The issuer derives only a limited benefit from more relaxed federal rules because it
still must comply with the more restrictive state rules. 47 Fed. Reg. 11,251, 11,262 prelim.
n.2 (1982). The cost to the issuer of preparing information generally will depend on the most
restrictive set of laws with which it must comply.
287. The apparent effect of Rule 504 is to make offerings below $500 thousand by nonExchange Act companies governed largely by state law; however, federal anti-fraud and civil
liability still apply. 47 Fed. Reg. 11,251, 11,258, 11,266 (1982) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. §
230.504(a)). An unsophisticated issuer easily could neglect to follow residual federal requirements on manner of offering, resales, and filing notice of sales. Such inadvertent failure to
comply with all of the federal requirements causes the issuer to lose the Rule 504 exemption
and suffer liability for violating § 5 of the Act. 47 Fed. Reg. 11,251, 11,266 (1982) (to be
codified at 17 C.F.R. § 230.504(b)). This is an excessively harsh result, particularly because
filing the notice of sales form was not a condition precedent under Rule 240. 17 C.F.R. §
230.240(h)(2) (1981).
288. The Commission understands that, following its adoption of regulation D, the
NASAA [North American Securities Administrators Association] Subcommittee will recommend adoption by NASAA of modifications to its uniform limited offering exemption to provide for a uniform exemptive system. This sys-
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a uniform federal-state exemption scheme depends on the willingness of state securities administrators to follow the SEC mandate
of unification.
In Reg. D, the SEC apparently has shifted its emphasis in regulating exempt offerings in three ways. First, regulatory policy has
shifted to focus directly on the ability of the issuer to provide information without undue hardship.2 8 9 By excluding Exchange Act
companies from using Rule 504, and by tiering the disclosure obligations of other issuers according to the amount of the offering, the
SEC demonstrated its intent to assist small businesses through lenient disclosure provisions.2 90 Second, regulatory emphasis has
shifted from protecting offerees to protecting purchasers only,29 1
based on the presumption that an investor not purchasing suffers
no legal harm.29 2 Finally, by expanding the definition of accredited
investors, the SEC has equated wealth with sophistication and
with access to information.293 Under Reg. D, issuers have no duty

tern will endorse rule 505 with certain additional terms as one option, and rules
505 and 506 with no changes as a second option.
The additional terms that NASAA is expected to consider involve the following: (1) Restriction on transaction related remuneration; (2) Disqualification of
issuers and other persons associated with offerings on the basis of state administrative orders or judgments; (3) Qualification of investors based on the suitability of the investment; and (4) Requirements for filing of the notices of sales.
An official policy guideline of NASAA represents endorsement of a principle
which NASAA believes has general application. NASAA has no power to enact
legislation, promulgate regulations, or otherwise bind the legislatures or administrative agencies of its members.
47 Fed. Reg. 11,251, 11,253 & n.10 (1982).
289. For a discussion of the new emphasis on the issuer's ability to make disclosures, see
supra note 126 and accompanying text.
290. Letter from Mr. Marshall J. Parker, Acting Chief Counsel for Advocacy, SBA, to Mr.
George A. Fitzsimmons, Secretary, SEC (May 27, 1981) (discussing proposed size definitions
of "small business").
291. For discussion of offeree protection requirements under prior rules, see supra note
40 and accompanying text.
292. The Supreme Court, in Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723
(1975), supported such reasoning by holding that "one asserting a claim for damages based
on a violation of Rule 10b-5 must be either a purchaser or seller of securities." Id. at 749.
293. Prior to Reg. D, there were two general categories of accredited investors: persons
with access to information, and financial institutions. 17 C.F.R. § 230.242(a)(1) (1981). Financial institutions presumably did not invest without adequate disclosures, and persons
with access to information did not need separate disclosures.
Reg. D introduces wealth as a standard for being an accredited investor. 47 Fed. Reg.
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to determine whether sufficiently wealthy investors are sophisticated or to supply them with specific information.2 9 4 This is potentially the most beneficial provision of Reg. D for small issuers, yet
it sacrifices some of the investor protection available under Rule
29 5
146 and Ralston Purina.
Reg. D leaves many questions unanswered, and raises additional
problems. It achieves a precarious balance between investor protection and capital formation, and might sacrifice too much of the
former to benefit the latter. The SEC has been developing innovative solutions to the problems of small businesses, as evidenced by
its energetic rulemaking during the past decade. With Congress,
the SEC may act again to improve the climate for the nation's
small businesses. Presently, however, Reg. D is a significant step
toward a properly balanced and unified exemption framework.
MARVIN

R.

MOHNEY

11,251, 11,262-63 (1982) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a)(3), (6), (7)). The Commission, therefore, must presume wealthy people will not invest without information, specific
disclosures are necessary to protect only investors with limited resources.
294. If the issuer reasonably believes that potential investors are accredited, it has no
specific disclosure obligation and does not have to make a purchaser sophistication test
under Rule 506. Id. at 11,251, 11,266 (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 230.506(b)(2)(ii)).
295. See supra note 28. The new definitions of accredited investors provide issuers with
access to a tremendous amount of equity financing without specific disclosure requirements.
Wealthy persons are not necessarily financially sophisticated, however, and Reg. D does not
ensure that they will have access to information about the issuer. For a discussion of access,
see supra note 110 and accompanying text. One must question whether the SEC has met its
duty to act consistently with the protection of investors. See Securities Exchange Act of
1934, § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 78(b) (1976).
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